No Peace without Justice in Timor Leste

By 9.30pm the streets of Dili, capital of Timor Leste (East Timor), have few pedestrians; the white vehicles of the United Nations and international aid organisations speed past the tents of the internally displaced and the rapidly emptying beach bars. A curfew has been in place since February when army mutineers apparently attempted to assassinate both President and Prime Minister, leaving their leader Reinado dead. President and Nobel peace prize-winner José Ramos Horta is recovering in a Darwin hospital from stomach wounds and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao escaped injury. How did this newest nation in Asia come to such levels of violence, distrust and division so quickly? writes Steve Kibble

Timor Leste, an ex-Portuguese colony, was invaded by the Indonesian army in 1975, with international connivance. During 24 years of occupation, the country lost a third of its population of just under a million to war, famine, mass displacement, violence and repression. The UK sold arms to the Indonesian military. Determined campaigning from the Timorese; the UN's refusal to recognise Indonesian rule; the Vatican's refusal to put the Timor Leste Church under the Indonesian Bishops Conference; the Asian financial crisis; the fall of General Suharto; and international campaigning supported by organisations like Progressio and CAFOD, eventually led to a referendum. The Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence. In response, the Indonesian army forcibly displaced up to a third of the population, killing many and destroying 70% of the country's infrastructure. An international force, led by Australia, finally restored order and the UN administered the country through to independence in 2002.

Since then, there have been a number of investigations by the UN, the Indonesia Human Rights Commission and by Timor Leste, all of which have pointed to serious abuses and even named abusers. In 2005, the Timor Leste Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation's report Chega! ('Enough! Stop It!') finally handed its recommendations on reparation and public recognition of the victims of human rights violations to the Timorese government and the international community. Yet, the Indonesians consistently refused to cooperate with the UN special panels or to extradite those indicted.

Instead, in exchange for Indonesian support for Timor Leste's candidature to the Association of South East Asian Nations and other goals, the two governments have agreed to a 'Truth and Friendship Commission'. This has already been widely condemned, including by the United Nations, for its lack of prosecutorial powers.

These failed attempts to obtain justice for the victims of the occupation and the violent aftermath of the 1999 popular consultation have created a growing climate of impunity in both Timor Leste and Indonesia with gross human rights violators beginning to believe that they will never be held accountable. As long as this continues, violent political opportunism will prevail as violence breeds impunity in turn breeding violence.

This inheritance is made worse by lack of effective government and due process of law combined with massive poverty and 50-80% youth unemployment. Considerable ethnic divisions and resentment of well-paid foreign nationals help fuel Timorese frustration further, particularly among the young. While the churches have tried to overcome this, they have largely appeared to be unsure of their role.

On my recent trip to Timor Leste, many spoke of the pressing need to break the cycle of violence and impunity and for the Timorese parliament to discuss the Chega! report. Fortunately, there are some encouraging signs that peace may be possible. There were peaceful elections in 2007 (albeit with a violent aftermath), the Church is helping to lead the way on peace-building initiatives among leaders of youth gangs, and an increasing number of younger parliamentarians are pushing for development rather than sterile debates on past grievances.

Once Chega! is discussed in Dili other parliaments and governments can then face up to its recommendations. As far as the UK is concerned, Progressio believes there is a very real need for acknowledgement of past assistance to Indonesian military regimes and for practical assistance to help bring about justice and reconciliation.

By ensuring the Chega! report becomes part of Timor Leste's school curriculum and by imposing a travel ban on named Indonesian human rights abusers - some of whom may be standing for the Indonesian parliament next year - this process can be helped along.

In the long term, what is really needed is a UN tribunal to try violators. In the meantime, through our local and international advocacy work, Progressio will continue to call for justice and reparations for the victims of the occupation and for the cycle of violence and impunity to be broken.

Dr Steve Kibble is Progressio's advocacy coordinator for Africa, Middle East and Asia.