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West Papua

The struggle for peace with justice

Neles Tebay



Published May 2005 by the
Catholic Institute for International Relations
Unit 3, 190a New North Road,
London N1 7BJ, UK
www.ciir.org

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ISBN 1 85287 316 7

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

CIIR is registered in the UK as a charity (number 294329) and a company (number 2002500)



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Design: Twenty-Five Educational


Print: APG (APG holds ISO14001 accreditation for international environmental standards)

Cover photo: A couple fishing on the beach near Merauke, on the south coast of West Papua. Photo © Rob Huibers/PANOS

About the author

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
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Introduction

West Papua is the western half of the island of New Guinea (the eastern half is the independent state of Papua New Guinea). It is situated just 250 kms to the north of Australia. In recent years the territory has been variously known as Irian Jaya (the Indonesian term for the territory), West Papua or simply as Papua. This Comment uses the term West Papua. (For a further note on terminology, see the Afterword on page 28.)

West Papua was occupied by Indonesia in May 1963. Since that time Indonesia has denied indigenous Papuans a genuine opportunity for self-determination. Papuans are now facing a real threat to their survival in their own land, due to continued subjugation and suppression by the Indonesian authorities, ongoing crimes against humanity committed by the Indonesian military, and the neglect of their socio-economic and cultural rights.

Despite these injustices, Papuans – supported by civil society organisations at a national and international level – have been working for lasting peace. Yet the efforts of the peace movement and the continued injustices suffered by indigenous Papuans go largely unreported in the western media.

This Comment intends to describe the injustices in West Papua. The first part gives the historical background, examining in particular the role of Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Nations in denying Papuans the right to self-determination in the 1960s. The second part describes the threat to the continued survival of indigenous Papuans. The third part reviews Indonesia's policies towards West Papua, while part four examines the international community's approach. Part five deals with peace-building initiatives by civil society in West Papua. The Comment concludes with recommendations for addressing the continued injustices faced by indigenous Papuans in their own land.

This Comment is being published by CIIR to help raise awareness of the situation in West Papua. It is followed by an Afterword which outlines what CIIR is doing to promote peace in West Papua.

1: Historical background

Despite the diversity of ethnic groups on the island of New Guinea, all the indigenous people belong to the Melanesian race and are ethnographically distinct from the ethnic Malay people who comprise the majority of the Indonesian population.

The indigenous people themselves never divided the island into two parts as seen in the world map today. The border was drawn down the middle of the island in 1883 by the Dutch who controlled the western part of the island and the British and Germans who controlled the eastern side.

Following world war two, the eastern part of the island came under British and Australian administration until its transition to independence as the nation of Papua New Guinea in 1975.

The western part of the island remained a province of the Netherlands, despite the objections of the new Republic of Indonesia which laid claim to all the territories of the former Dutch East Indies. The Dutch, however, had always considered western New Guinea to be a separate entity from the rest of their East Indies territories.

In the 1950s the Dutch government began to prepare the territory for political independence by allowing the Papuans to establish political parties. A parliamentary election was held in February 1961 and the West Papua Parliament was established. The parliament then formed a Papuan people's committee which held a Papuan National Congress, resulting in four decisions: West Papua as the name of the country, Papua as the name of the nation, the Morning Star flag as the national flag, and *Hai Tanahku Papua* (Papua, my land) as the national anthem. On 1 December 1961, the Morning Star flag was officially raised alongside the Dutch flag in Jayapura, the capital of the territory. From that point on, the Papuans turned their attention towards the establishment of an independent state of West Papua.¹

Indonesia opposed these plans. When the Morning Star flag was raised in Jayapura, Indonesia responded by declaring the *trikora* (the three people's commands): to prevent the independence of West Papua, to fly the Indonesian flag in the territory, and to launch a general mobilisation of Indonesians to occupy the territory.

It was the height of the cold war period, and the United States had strategic interests in supporting Indonesia's claim to the territory of western New Guinea. The US consequently proposed an agreement that was signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August

1962. The New York Agreement contained guiding principles for an act of self-determination to settle the status of the territory – the so-called Act of Free Choice.

In line with the agreement, the territory was handed over by the Dutch to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). After the minimum period stipulated by the agreement, UNTEA transferred the administration of the territory to Indonesia, which would thenceforth take responsibility for arranging the Act of Free Choice. On 1 May 1963 the Dutch and West Papua flags were pulled down and the Indonesian flag was officially raised in the land of Papua.

As soon as Indonesia took over the administration, it treated the territory as an Indonesian province. It deployed thousands of military personnel, established nine regencies, set up governmental offices, and applied Indonesian laws and regulations. It dismissed immediately the West Papua Parliament that had been elected in 1961. In its place an Indonesian-appointed regional assembly, which included none of the elected Papuan parliament members, was established.

Despite the guarantee in the New York Agreement to freedom of speech, movement and assembly, the Indonesian government deliberately prohibited Papuans from undertaking any political activity. Presidential decree number 11/1963, designed by the Indonesian government to crack down on subversion, was also applied. Any Papuan political or cultural activity was considered to represent the Papuan aspiration for independence and therefore to be subversive.²

Organised Papuan resistance to the Indonesian occupation began in 1965 with the establishment of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM – the Free Papua Movement). The primary objective was to end the Indonesian occupation and then to establish a democratic state of West Papua. The OPM was poorly organised and, armed mainly with the traditional bow and arrow, was no match for the Indonesian military. However, although few Papuans joined the OPM in the jungle, its political ideology was – and continues to be – widely supported by a majority of Papuans.

The Indonesian government sought to suppress Papuan resistance through military operations such as Operasi Sadar (Operation Consciousness) in 1965 and Operasi Brathayudha in 1967. In early

1969, some months before the Act of Free Choice (AFC) was scheduled to take place, a third military operation called Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority) was conducted. This aimed to eradicate the Papuan resistance, tighten security, and consolidate Indonesian administrative authority throughout the territory. As the AFC drew closer, more Papuans were killed, intimidated and terrorised by the Indonesian military. The journalist Brian May wrote: 'Indonesian troops and officials were waging a widespread campaign of intimidation to force the Act of Free Choice in favour of the Republic.'³

Throughout this process, Indonesia received the tacit support of the United States.⁴ In 1968, the US ambassador in Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia) reported that 85 to 90 per cent of Papuans supported independence, and that Indonesian military operations, which had already killed thousands of civilians, had stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the Papuans. However, the US embassy also took the view that the loss of West Papua through the AFC would undermine and unseat Indonesian president Suharto's government. The US was keen to support Suharto because of his strong anti-communist stance. The embassy reported that a free and direct vote for the 'stone age' Papuans was, in any case, unrealistic. Washington was reminded to educate Ortiz Sanz, the head of the UN observer delegation for the AFC, about 'political realities' before he left New York for western New Guinea.

The Dutch also kept quiet about the process. They had little enthusiasm for any continuing involvement in the issue and did not want to see West Papua's self-determination become a stumbling block in the way of establishing genuine Netherlands-Indonesia cooperation. For the Dutch, maintaining a good relationship with Indonesia was more important than defending the fundamental right to self-determination of the Papuans.

The Act of Free Choice

The New York Agreement clearly stated that all adults from the territory were eligible to participate in the act of self-determination and that this should be 'carried out in accordance with international practice'.⁵ However, the Indonesian government was intent on applying its own method of *musyawarah* (a process of collective decision-making). With this method, only a few people were selected

as representatives, while the majority of Papuans were excluded.

From the more than 800,000 Papuans at that time, the Indonesian authorities – not the Papuans – picked only 1,026 people as representatives to exercise the AFC, which was to take place in July and August of 1969. Of these, 931 were selected without the presence of UN observers. In fact, the UN team provided only a token presence during the exercise of the AFC. The team, headed by Ortiz Sanz, a Bolivian diplomat, comprised just 16 staff including administrative personnel. In comparison, the UN presence for the referendum in East Timor in 1999 totalled more than 1,000 staff.

There was no possibility of even these few hand-picked representatives exercising freedom of choice. They were taken out to a highly guarded boarding house for several weeks before the day of the AFC, totally isolated from the rest of the community and under pressure and intimidation from the Indonesian military. They were given exact written instructions about what to say and were forced by the government to rehearse their speeches. They were warned of the risk if they decided to separate from Indonesia.

What happened in the town of Merauke gives a picture of how the AFC was conducted by Indonesia. The government picked some 175 people as the ‘representatives’ of the Papuans in Merauke regency. On the day the AFC was conducted, the government selected only 20 people out of these 175 ‘representatives’ to stand up and express one after the other the declaration provided by the government. Their statements were almost identical. They proclaimed that they were part of Indonesia since 1945, and recognised only one country, one constitution, one flag, and one government, that of Indonesia. After that the chairman of the AFC in Merauke, who was an Indonesian official, told the other 155 members to stand up if they agreed with the declaration of their colleagues. All then stood up, meaning all agreed.

This was the way the Indonesian government held the Act of Free Choice. The same method was applied in the other seven towns. It is not surprising, then, that the result was a unanimous declaration to join Indonesia.

The role of the United Nations

Indonesia claimed that the AFC had been conducted democratically and transparently, with the involvement of the Papuans in deciding

the methods of voting and the participation, consultation and assistance of the United Nations.⁶ Having colluded in the conduct of the act, the UN representative Ortiz Sanz declared, in his report to the UN in November 1969, that ‘an act of free choice has taken place’.⁷

The Dutch, along with a few other countries, proposed a resolution to approve the result of the fraudulent AFC. Several African countries condemned the conduct of the AFC as undemocratic, and proposed an amendment calling for a proper vote of self-determination to be held in 1975. This amendment was defeated. The UN General Assembly then voted, with 30 abstentions, simply to ‘take note’ of the official report on the AFC by the then UN secretary general U Thant. Although this fell short of formally approving the AFC, it gave the UN’s imprimatur to the sham.

The UN secretariat’s position was to ensure that the territory of western New Guinea became a recognised part of Indonesia with the minimum of controversy and disruption. Hence U Thant and Ortiz Sanz collaborated with Jakarta to prevent any international criticism of the AFC emerging. Sharing the position of the Dutch, the US, and other countries such as Australia and Japan, the UN secretariat considered that direct voting in the territory was unnecessary, and therefore supported the Indonesian method of exercising the AFC. The UN tolerated Indonesian interference and intimidation against the Papuans and made no effort to press Jakarta to properly implement the terms of the New York Agreement.

Under the New York Agreement, the Dutch, Indonesia and the UN had an obligation to protect the political rights and freedom of the Papuans, and to ensure that the AFC took place freely in accordance with international practice. But the three parties failed to do this, and they did so deliberately because genuine self-determination was never considered as a serious option by any of them. The Papuans’ political and human rights were effectively discarded by Indonesia with the support of the Dutch, the US, and the UN. Chakravarthy Narashiman, the UN under-secretary general at the time, has subsequently admitted (in 2001) that the so-called Act of Free Choice was a ‘sham’ and a ‘whitewash’.⁸

2: Papuans under threat

Following its annexation of West Papua through the Act of Free Choice, Indonesia gave Indonesian citizenship to the Papuans. The territory was re-named Irian Jaya, meaning 'victorious Irian' (Irian stands for 'Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti-Nederland' or 'join the Indonesian republic against the Netherlands'). Henceforth in this Comment, however, I will refer to the territory as West Papua.

The Indonesian government immediately declared West Papua a military operation zone, and over the years has conducted a series of military operations designed to eradicate Papuan separatism. The territory was heavily controlled by the Indonesian military (in so far as the geography and lack of development of the country permitted: many communities are virtually isolated from external contact). Some regions were completely closed to visitors: anyone who wanted to visit these regions was obliged first to get a permit from the security forces. For many Papuans, living under Indonesian control was like living life in prison.

Human rights violations

For some Papuans, the experience was much worse. There are no reliable figures for the numbers of Papuans killed over the years by Indonesian security forces, either directly or as a result of the consequences of military operations. However, local and international human rights groups have estimated the figure to be many thousands. Many stories too are recounted by Papuans. Whether or not these have been independently verified or documented, they all add to the collective trauma of the Papuan people. Even if it is not possible to give definitive totals for human rights violations, the nature of some individual incidents gives a sense of the degree of terror that all Papuans are aware of, and that some Papuans have to endure.

The alleged methods of killing are horrific. Some Papuans were killed by having their bodies slashed with razors.⁹ Others died after a hot iron bar was inserted into their anus.¹⁰ A killed Papuan man had his flesh made into a barbeque, and his wife was forced to eat her husband, and his children to eat their father.¹¹ In Dila village, Indonesian troops killed Nalogoban Kibak, a tribal leader; filled a bucket with his blood; then forced other tribal leaders, teachers, and pastors of the area, at gunpoint, to drink the blood.¹² In another

village, Indonesian troops captured 30 Papuan men, forced them into boats, tied stones around their necks, and threw them overboard.¹³

Papuan women have also been killed in barbaric ways. In Kuyawage village, the army used bayonets to tear pregnant women open to the chest and then cut their unborn babies into halves. In Biak, the soldiers shot dead Maria Bonsapia, a pregnant Papuan woman, before a crowd of 80 women and children, cut the foetus out of her body, and dissected the baby.¹⁴

Whole communities have been terrorised by Indonesian soldiers. The soldiers have assaulted villagers, burned houses and church buildings, destroyed food gardens and shot the villagers' pigs and chickens. Many villagers take refuge in the jungle where many have died of sicknesses and shortage of food.

Indonesian officials commonly subjected Papuan political prisoners to torture, including electric shocks, beating, pistol-whipping, deprivation of toilet facilities, and water torture, in which the prisoners were placed in a bunker filled with water.¹⁵

Despite investigations by Komnas Ham (the abbreviated name for Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia – the Indonesian Commission on Human Rights), the army continues to operate with apparent impunity. For example, in April 2003 it launched a massive military operation in and around Wamena, following the theft of weapons from an army weapons store. Without any critical or objective investigation of the stealing of the weapons, the army immediately blamed 'Papuan separatists' and launched the military operation. Komnas Ham reported that nine people were killed, another 38 were tortured and 15 others were arbitrarily arrested. The military operation displaced some 7,000 Papuans from 25 villages and at least 42 Papuans later died in refugee camps in the jungle. As many as 168 members of the military have been named as suspects, but as yet no action has been taken against them.¹⁶

In August 2004, the Indonesian army launched a fresh military operation in Puncak Jaya district. Indonesian troops destroyed villagers' homes and food gardens, and burned down some churches. Church leaders and human rights groups in West Papua reported that at least 6,000 Papuans had been left homeless and faced starvation in the refugee camps.¹⁷ Since the region was closed off to aid workers and church leaders by the Indonesian military, it was difficult to provide food and medical supplies to the refugees. The refugees

feared returning to their homes because any Papuan emerging from the forest is accused of being a separatist by Indonesian forces. Human rights groups in West Papua and Jakarta, as well as church leaders, said the military orchestrated the incident by using local Papuans as militias.¹⁸

The available evidence strongly suggests that the Indonesian military has engaged in widespread violence and extra-judicial killings, subjected Papuan men and women to acts of torture, disappearance, rape, and sexual violence, and by its actions caused the displacement of many Papuans from their homes. Many of these acts, individually and collectively, clearly constitute crimes against humanity under international law.¹⁹ It is likely that crimes against humanity in West Papua will continue in the future, until such time as the perpetrators feel they can no longer act with impunity.

Denial of Papuan culture

Almost any cultural expression by the Papuans has for many years been considered by the Indonesian government to be a manifestation of the separatist movement. Papuans who sang in their local language could be beaten, tortured, detained or even killed by the Indonesian security forces in the name of eradicating separatism. Papuan traditional cultures were also treated as uncivilised and primitive by many Indonesians. The government sought to make Papuans feel ashamed of their traditional ways and to undermine these in the name of modernisation and development – or, more accurately, ‘Indonesianisation’. Papuans were not allowed by the government to identify themselves as Papuans or Melanesians: instead, the government taught the Papuans to call themselves ‘Indonesians from Irian Jaya province’.

A significant example of the undermining of Papuan culture is the way that Papuans have been separated from their land. In former days, the Papuans were the owners of the forest under customary *adat* (traditional law). The forest had both an economic and a religious meaning for the Papuans. It was considered a source of food, a shelter in time of tribal war, and a place to communicate with ancestral spirits. To the Papuans, the meaning of the forest is embodied in their saying: ‘the forest is our mother’.

However, under Indonesian rule, Papuans were no longer considered as the owners of ancestral lands. Their lands were

plundered on the pretext of national development, and their forests expropriated and exploited. Companies with their head offices in Jakarta have divided the forests in West Papua among themselves. Government authorities and business people, who are mostly non-Papuans, have become the putative owners of the forests and land (at least for as long as it takes them to extract its resources). The Papuans, the true owners of the land, have become mere guardians of the forests, which are now considered to belong to other people.²⁰ Once a private company has begun its forestry exploitation activity, the Papuans are not allowed to enter into the claimed forest, not even to collect firewood.

The interests of most of these private companies are protected and safeguarded by the Indonesian security forces. When the Papuans demand their rights to ownership of the forest, they are accused of being separatists, the label that gives justification to the security forces to use violence against them.²¹ Many abuses have arisen from a military and police presence aimed at protecting mining firms, forest concessions and timber estates exploiting natural resources. In addition, the illegal logging business is thriving in West Papua. Often this takes place with the protection – and even the direct involvement – of the security forces. Indeed, the military's extensive business interests are an important factor behind their presence in West Papua.

The Papuans are powerless in the face of this collaboration between the government, the military, and the private companies who grab their land. As recognised by the Papuans of the Amungme tribe, 'by using the label of separatist, and gun-pointing against us, the government, private companies and the Indonesians easily rob our land without consulting us.'²²

Poverty

West Papua's economy is dominated by the exploitation of natural resources – yet few economic benefits have flowed back to West Papua from this resource exploitation. Most significant to the resource economy is the copper and gold mining operation by Freeport Indonesia, which has been the source of over half of West Papua's gross domestic product.²³ Yet in 1997, for example, less than 12 per cent (US\$28 million) of total taxes paid by Freeport Indonesia was disbursed to West Papua.²⁴

Meanwhile, local economies are dominated by Indonesian migrants (see below), while the indigenous Papuans remain very poor. The United Nations Development Programme in 2002 ranked West Papua second to last in terms of poverty levels in Indonesia's provinces.²⁵ Indigenous Papuans in coastal regions live only from sago and fish provided by nature, while Papuans in mountainous regions live from sweet potatoes and vegetables.

More than 50 per cent of children under five years old are undernourished. Only 41 per cent of Papuan children are immunised, compared with an Indonesian national average of 60 per cent. The infant mortality rate is very high – 117 per 1,000 infants – much higher than the Indonesian national rate of 50 per 1,000 infants. The maternal mortality rate is three times greater in West Papua than in the rest of Indonesia.²⁶ While the government has established clinics in every sub-regency, these centres are poorly staffed and under-equipped. Inadequate primary health care results in fatalities from preventable diseases.

This has been worsened by the rapid spread of HIV and AIDS in West Papua. It has been estimated that as much as five per cent of the population has already been infected.²⁷ Risk factors in HIV and AIDS transmission are influenced by the clash of modernisation and traditional cultural practices.²⁸ The lack of public awareness and knowledge on HIV and AIDS and the reluctance to use condoms has also contributed to the spread of the epidemic,²⁹ which may ultimately wipe out Papuans faster than any military operation.

Education is also a problem. The literacy rate for Papuan women reaches only 44 per cent (compared to 78 per cent in the rest of Indonesia). For men the figure is 58 per cent (compared to 90 per cent nationwide).³⁰ Only 10 per cent of indigenous Papuans have a high school education and only one per cent have graduated from college.³¹ The centralised curriculum is estranged from local cultures, resulting in the alienation of Papuan pupils from their cultural traditions. Schools in remote areas where the students are exclusively Papuan lack teaching materials almost entirely. Teachers lack qualifications, and school buildings are neglected.

Influx of Indonesian migrants

There are at least 252 Papuan ethnic groups. When West Papua was under Dutch rule, Papuans were very much the majority. Since

Indonesia took over the territory from the Dutch, however, this demographics has been altered due to the influx of Indonesian migrants. Of 2.4 million people in West Papua, nearly half (48 per cent) are now non-Papuans.³²

Some migrants were brought in by the Indonesian government under the programme of transmigration (internal migration, for example of poor people from the populous island of Java to other, less populated parts of the Indonesian archipelago). Between 1964 and 1999 the government settled nearly 550,000 of these migrants in West Papua.³³ They occupy 216 settlements or villages built by the government. They have easy access to the towns because the government has built roads linking their villages with the nearest town. Slowly but surely these transmigration sites have developed into towns in their own right, with ballooning populations. Meanwhile, spontaneous migrants – those who come not as part of government programmes but in order to seek opportunities for work or business – have been settling in all West Papua's major towns.

In 1980, 30 per cent of the population in nine towns were Indonesians who were not born in West Papua. In 1987, the total number of such Indonesians in the towns had increased, reaching 65 per cent while Papuans represented only 35 per cent. The proportion of migrants in towns is still increasing, for thousands of migrants come to West Papua's towns every year. Consequently, the Papuans are more 'absent' than ever in the towns.

The migrants have been playing a dominant role in society. They excel in trade, services, construction and contracting in all major towns. Until 2001, when there was a change in government policy, government offices were largely occupied by the migrants, their descendants and relatives. Papuans had great difficulty finding jobs in migrant-dominated government offices, while the migrants obviously did not.

The migrants have also been reaping the benefit of government development activities, which have been concentrated in West Papua's towns. The majority of Papuans, who live in isolated and remote villages, have received no benefit from these development programmes. So the Papuans are marginalised in the towns and ignored in the remote villages.

In the future, many more migrants will come to West Papua due to the proposed reorganisation of the way the territory is

administered and natural resource developments such as the massive liquefied natural gas exploitation being led by British Petroleum (BP). All these will create many new jobs and require qualified and skilled people. Papuans cannot fill all or even many of the jobs. BP will inevitably hire more migrants than Papuans to run their operations. If the trend of the influx of Indonesian migrants continues, then within a few years the Papuans, who are already a tiny minority in Indonesia, will be a minority in their own land of West Papua.

Unless all these issues are addressed, Papuans face the very real threat of the continued dilution, if not indeed the extinction, of their identity as an ethnic group.

3: Indonesian policies towards West Papua

Since the beginning of its occupation of the territory, Indonesia has believed that its mission in West Papua is to ‘civilise’ the Papuan people. The Indonesian government is committed to modernising society and including the Papuans in a common Indonesian culture by introducing them to the mainstream of Indonesian life and culture.

However, despite this apparently clear mission, the government has not followed a consistent policy towards West Papua. Rather, it has adopted a range of strategies, some of them running parallel to – or even in conflict with – other strategies.

For more than 30 years from its first occupation of the territory, Indonesian policy was largely based on military operations designed to eradicate Papuan separatism. This approach has, however, been unsuccessful. Instead, the military operations have brought about crimes against humanity and strengthened the Papuan people’s demand for political independence.

Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, introduced a different policy in 1999 with the offer of the status of special autonomy. In 2001, his successor, president Megawati Soekarno Putri, approved law number 21/2001 on West Papua’s special autonomy. The law allows West Papua to:

- express Papuan cultural identity through the Papuan flag and anthem
- establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for historical rectification of the history of West Papua and a representative office of the Indonesian Commission on Human Rights
- assume all governmental powers except international relations, defence, monetary policy and the supreme court
- receive 80 per cent of revenues from forestry, fisheries, and mining, and 70 per cent of revenues from oil and gas exploration
- set up a Papuan People’s Assembly as an ‘upper house’ of indigenous people representing ethnic groups, religions, and women.

However, the Megawati government failed to implement the law by deliberately putting off issuing a government regulation to establish the Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly). Having come to the view that the special autonomy law would simply strengthen the separatist movement and even accelerate the creation of an

independent state of West Papua, the Megawati government proposed instead through presidential instruction number 1/2003 to divide West Papua into three provinces. This controversial policy, which violates the terms of the special autonomy law, is considered by many to be a divide-and-conquer attempt to destroy Papuan cultural unity. Therefore, the policy has been strongly opposed by the Papuans and some Indonesian politicians.

The sixth Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was elected in October 2004, has indicated that he is committed to implementing the special autonomy law for West Papua. In December 2004 he produced government regulation number 54/2004 on the establishment of the Papuan People's Assembly (although simply as a consultative, not a decision-making, body). However, he has not yet given a clear indication of how he intends to settle the controversial government policy of the establishment of new provinces, which flies in the face of the special autonomy law. To date, the status of special autonomy for West Papua has been an empty promise and its law has been a useless piece of paper.

It seems that Jakarta still has no clear concept of how to address the problems in West Papua. Furthermore, the government lacks clear policies and credible processes for addressing such problems as crimes against humanity, the controversial 1969 Act of Free Choice, and the neglect of the socio-economic and cultural rights of the Papuans. Successive Indonesian governments have been using a 'trial and error' approach to handling West Papua; and instead of listening to the people's aspirations, have shown a determination to impose their own will upon the Papuans.

Systematic campaign to destabilise West Papua

Since the special autonomy law was first passed, it seems that Jakarta has been carrying out a systematic campaign to destabilise West Papua. Documents leaked to human rights activists in Jayapura reveal that in June 2000 senior Indonesian government and military leaders met to discuss plans to oppose and defuse the Papuan people's call for a genuine dialogue to settle injustices in West Papua.³⁴ The plans involve eradicating the Papuan separatist movement, establishing militia groups, and improving the social welfare of the Papuan people.

A list of the Papuan figures considered to be a threat to the

government due to their stance was included in the document. They Hiyo Eluay, a moderate Papuan leader who had been advocating dialogue for a peaceful settlement of the injustices in West Papua, was one among the Papuans whose names appeared in the document. He was killed in November 2001 by the Indonesian army's notorious special force, Kopassus. Although the soldiers who killed They Eluay have been tried and convicted, they received lenient sentences (a maximum of three and a half years in prison), and were subsequently lauded as national heroes by a senior Indonesian army officer.³⁵

Since 2000, the Indonesian military has been establishing local militias among native Papuans to carry out some of the military's 'dirty work' and to create a climate of increased instability and violence. In 2003, Timbul Silaen, East Timor's police chief in 1999, was appointed police chief of West Papua, while Eurico Guterres, the notorious East Timor militia leader, visited West Papua to establish the Front Pembela Merah Putih (Red and White Defenders' Front). Both men were notorious for their links to crimes against humanity committed in East Timor before and after the 1999 popular consultation that led to East Timorese independence. Some commentators consider their involvement in West Papua to be a signal that the army is dictating Indonesian policy on West Papua and attempting to consolidate its own dominant position.

The systematic campaign of destabilisation has resulted in a continued threat to the human security of the Papuan people. As in the past, it is the Papuans who are always suspected, arrested, tortured, killed and oppressed by the Indonesian security forces. They find no credible guarantee for their human security under Indonesian rule. They feel they can easily be killed any time and anywhere. Consequently, they have been living in fear without freedom and liberty.

A further consequence of the climate of instability is the impact on the local government's ability to promote development in West Papua. Local government is kept busy dealing with the consequences of the controversial policies produced by central government, while security problems are such a regular occurrence that local government has almost no chance to think of development.

4: International policy on West Papua

Although Indonesia's desire to hold on to West Papua is partly motivated by its self-appointed mission to 'civilise' the indigenous Papuans, the determining factor remains the wealth of natural resources that the territory puts at Indonesia's disposal. These resources are of great value to the Indonesian state, which has granted concessions to Indonesian and foreign companies – often in disregard of the customary rights of indigenous Papuans. In return the state reaps considerable dividends in the form of taxes and royalties. The financial contribution of West Papua's timber industries to Jakarta, for example, has been approximately US\$100 million a year.³⁶

Many timber industries in West Papua are dominated by military and political elites from the era of the former president Suharto. Indonesian security forces also have a financial interest in resource extraction in West Papua, through direct involvement in logging and other activities and protection fees paid by resource companies. All of these beneficiaries are non-Papuans. Alongside the substantial tax and royalties accrued by the state, these interests are a powerful reason for the Indonesian state and its elites to keep control of West Papua.

The other major resource industry is mining. The Freeport copper and gold mine in West Papua has long been one of the most controversial natural resource projects in Indonesia. It is operated by Freeport Indonesia, a subsidiary of US company Freeport McMoran which signed a production contract with Indonesia in 1967, two years before the establishment of Indonesian sovereignty over Papua.³⁷

In 1988 the Grasberg mountain, next to the existing mine, was found to contain huge mineral deposits. Grasberg transformed Freeport into one of the biggest producers of copper and gold in the world and increased West Papua's importance to Indonesia. During the period 1991-2001, the American-owned company paid an average of US\$180 million in taxes and revenues to the Indonesian state each year, making it Indonesia's single largest taxpayer.³⁸ It has also, over the years, paid tens of millions of dollars to the Indonesian military for security protection.³⁹ The company has rights to explore some 2.3 million acres of land outside its current area of operations, which it hopes could contain more mineral deposits, and it has been looking

at mining options in other areas of West Papua.

Freeport McMoran has long been well connected within the US political establishment: its board members include Henry Kissinger and J Stapleton Roy, a former US ambassador to Indonesia (from 1995-1999). The desire to protect the Freeport mine continues to shape US policy towards West Papua.

A major new investment is the Tangguh project that will exploit liquefied natural gas reserves in West Papua. The major stakeholder in the project is British Petroleum (BP) alongside a number of Chinese and Japanese companies. BP is developing the project under a production-sharing contract with Indonesia's state-owned oil company Pertamina. The project will take up about 3,000 hectares of land. BP plans to invest US\$2 billion, which could create revenues of US\$32 billion between 2006, when exports are due to begin, and 2030. It is estimated that the Indonesian government will earn nearly US\$9 billion from the project during this period, of which some US\$3.6 billion will go to West Papua.⁴⁰ The desire to protect the Tangguh project will shape the policies on West Papua of the UK, China and Japan.

It is obvious that powerful states and the Indonesian government share the same interest, which is the economic benefit of exploiting West Papua's natural resources. A major concern of these countries is to protect their investment and cement their relationship with Indonesia, which with a population of 220 million also offers a huge potential market. Having deliberately ignored the fraudulent nature of the so-called Act of Free Choice in order to build a long term relationship with Indonesia, it is unlikely that these powerful states will sacrifice their economic interests for the sake of the Papuan people's human security. In general this is considered to be an internal matter for Indonesia rather than an issue for the international community to address.

For the international community as much as for Indonesia, the offer of special autonomy is a convenient response to the Papuans' demand for independence. According to the American think-tank the Council on Foreign Relations, special autonomy is a win-win solution: it keeps West Papua within Indonesia while advancing the needs of Papuans.⁴¹ The Pacific Islands Forum – the forum of all Pacific countries including Australia and New Zealand – supports special autonomy,⁴² while the European Union is committed to

giving financial and technical assistance for the implementation of the special autonomy law.⁴³

It is clear that keeping West Papua within the Republic of Indonesia, despite the threat under Indonesian rule to the culture and survival of indigenous Papuans, remains a common policy among the world's most powerful states, precisely because it does not disturb their economic interests in Indonesia and West Papua.

5: Peace-building initiatives in West Papua

The fall of Suharto's regime in 1998 changed the political atmosphere in Indonesia. There was more room for democracy. The Papuans used this newly-born democratic atmosphere to change their method of resistance. They put aside armed struggle and took up peaceful demands for independence, mostly through peaceful demonstrations held in all West Papua's major towns with the participation of thousands of Papuans. The resistance was no longer the activity of a few Papuans in the jungle, but a peaceful resistance of all Papuans.

In February 1999, 100 leading Papuans met with the Indonesian president B J Habibie and all the ministers in the state palace in Jakarta. They expressed their aspiration of establishing an independent state of West Papua. Their call for independence was rejected, as previously expected, but the Papuans were so excited for it was the first time in the history of West Papua that they could express their aspiration openly and honestly to the Indonesian government.

In February 2000, the Papuans held a grand convention in Jayapura, attended by hundreds of participants from all West Papua's regencies. They reiterated their rejection of the fraudulent Act of Free Choice in 1969, which they began to call the Act of No Choice.

The Papuans' commitment to a peaceful struggle for independence was strengthened in a Papuan Congress held in Jayapura in June 2000. It was attended by some 5,000 Papuans from within West Papua as well as from exile communities overseas. At this Congress, the Papuans declared their aspiration for independence and their commitment to peaceful methods such as dialogue and negotiation among all concerned parties, including the Indonesian government. An all-inclusive organisation called the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium Council) was established to lead this peaceful struggle and to represent the Papuans in dialogue and negotiations for independence. They highlighted three problems that should be settled through dialogue: the neglect of socio-economic and cultural rights, the violations of civil and political rights since 1963, and the denial of the right to self-determination in 1969.

Papuan leaders have called on the UN, the US, the Dutch and Indonesia to review their respective conducts before, during, and after the exercise of the shameful Act of No Choice in 1969. However, although the Dutch are sponsoring research into the

historical events of the 1960s, the call to the international community on this matter has so far fallen on deaf ears. The Republic of Vanuatu has been the only country in the world that has continuously reminded the UN of its contribution to the denial of the Papuans' right to self-determination in 1969, and its responsibility for helping to address this injustice.

Meanwhile, despite Jakarta's systematic campaign to destabilise the territory, Papuan leaders have repeatedly called upon the Indonesian government to engage in a genuine dialogue, with the mediation of a third party. The Papuan Presidium Council has even submitted to the government its draft of the terms of reference of the proposed dialogue. The West Papuan provincial government and parliament, religious leaders, non-governmental organisations, other elements of civil society, and even the OPM have fully supported the call for an all-inclusive dialogue. The international community has also welcomed the call for dialogue. The EU – while explicitly not supporting calls for independence for West Papua – has called for the Indonesian government 'to engage in a genuine dialogue with the provinces in order to tackle the root causes of separatism'.⁴⁴ The government of New Zealand has even offered itself to be mediator of a peaceful dialogue between the Indonesian government and the Papuans. However, the Indonesian government has so far not responded to offers of mediation or shown any willingness to engage in dialogue.

Despite the suffering they have endured for more than 40 years – and despite the lack of encouragement from the Indonesian authorities – indigenous Papuans are committed to working for lasting peace. In June 1999, Papuan students at meetings held in Yapen Waropen district came up with the idea of creating a 'Zone of Peace'. In December 2002, Tom Beanal, the deputy chair of the Papuan Presidium Council and the tribal chief of the Amungme tribe, declared West Papua as a Zone of Peace. West Papua, stated the Papuan tribal chiefs' council, should be 'a territory which is free from violence, oppression and grief'.⁴⁵ This declaration expresses the desire of Papuans to live with dignity on their own land, where they will no longer be treated as separatists, but as human beings.

The declaration is based on the belief that peace is fundamentally important not only for the Papuans and non-Papuans living in West Papua, and for development activities, but also for the domestic and

foreign investors that have been and will be exploiting natural resources in West Papua.

The declaration commits Papuans to respect all migrants and minority groups in West Papua, but it rejects the presence of East Timor-style militia groups (like those set up by Eurico Guterres) and demands that Indonesia withdraw thousands of its combat troops, including the army's notorious special forces (Kopassus). Predictably, it has received a cool response from the Indonesian authorities, particularly the security forces which believe that the declaration is motivated by separatism. Indeed, the military considers that a 'zone of peace' can only be created by military action to eradicate separatism.

Church leaders have responded to the misinterpretation of the concept of a 'zone of peace' by declaring West Papua to be a Land of Peace. An Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches has been established to work for justice, peace, and human rights. In November 2004, the churches issued a joint appeal condemning injustice and oppression, emphasising the necessity of dialogue as the way to solve problems, and demanding that the Indonesian government address unresolved allegations of human rights violations.

Faith groups have for several years played a leading role in peace building in West Papua. The majority of indigenous Papuans are Christians, while the majority of Indonesian migrants follow Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Interfaith collaboration was manifested in 2001, for example, through a call for cessation of violence (in June 2001) and a joint letter to the Indonesian president calling for a national team of inquiry to probe the involvement of the Indonesian military in violating human rights (in December 2001). On 21 September 2002 – the United Nations' International Day of Peace – thousands of people, led by Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist leaders, gathered in Jayapura to pray for peace. The religious leaders subsequently identified 5 February as Papuan Day of Peace, and have been celebrating this date each year through various activities such as marches for peace, seminars and discussions on peace building.

This interfaith collaboration helps to break down religiously motivated suspicion in Papuan society. It plays an important role in promoting community-based reconciliation, which is also supported

by around 140 local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in areas such as socio-economic development, education, environment, and health care.

The most prominent role of local NGOs is in addressing state violence. They are involved in conflict mapping, monitoring and investigation, litigation and legal advocacy, campaigning, workshops and conferences, training and human rights education. They also address the causes and impact of structural violence, address issues of inter-ethnic and interfaith harmony and tolerance, and encourage the Papuans to adopt non-violent strategies.⁴⁶

Conclusion

There are three fundamental problems that should be addressed peacefully: the denial of the right to self-determination in 1969 by Indonesia with the support of the international community, crimes against humanity committed from 1963 until today, and the neglect of socio-economic and cultural rights. Papuans continue to face marginalisation in their own land. Some would say they are facing the threat of extinction.

Addressing these problems is not solely an internal matter for Indonesia. The international community through the UN has already been part of the problem. The UN, the US, the Netherlands and other countries have colluded with the Indonesian government in the annexation of West Papua through the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969. They now have a moral responsibility to promote peaceful and democratic approaches to settling the injustices in West Papua. It is morally unacceptable if the Netherlands, the US and other powerful states continue to sacrifice the very survival of the Papuans for the sake of their own political and economic interests.

In order to address peacefully the injustices in West Papua:

- The Indonesian government should be encouraged to involve indigenous Papuans in seeking just and peaceful solutions through an all-inclusive dialogue. All stakeholders representing the Indonesian government and the Papuans should participate in this dialogue. Such a dialogue would be a peaceful means for the Indonesian authorities and the Papuans to reach a common understanding on the problems that have to be addressed, and a common agreement on the role of each stakeholder. The government could invite a third party to be the facilitator of the dialogue.
- Alleged crimes against humanity should be investigated and addressed. The government should be encouraged to invite the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the special rapporteur on torture to visit West Papua.
- The Indonesian government should be encouraged to declare West Papua as a land of peace. As part of this commitment it should withdraw all combat troops, disband all militia groups, and halt the Indonesian military's involvement in commercial activities (legal and illegal) in the territory.

- The Indonesian government should be encouraged to implement without any delay law number 21/2001 on special autonomy for West Papua for it addresses the neglect and marginalisation of the socio-economic and cultural rights of the Papuans.
- The UN, the US, the Dutch, and the Indonesian government should be encouraged to review and tell the truth about their respective conduct in the run-up to, during, and after the exercise of the Act of No Choice in West Papua in 1969.

Afterword

A note on terminology

From 1969 to 2001, the western half of the island of New Guinea was called Irian Jaya by the Indonesian government. Papuans and their supporters often call it West Papua or simply Papua.

In 2001, following the passage of the law on special autonomy for the territory, the province of Irian Jaya was renamed the province of Papua. In 2003, the Indonesian government proposed to divide this province into three. As the first step in this process, a new province, covering the western tip of the territory and called West Irian Jaya, was created in February 2003.

In 2004, an Indonesian constitutional court ruled that the split violated the special autonomy law. However, while ruling that the other proposed province of Central Irian Jaya should not be created, the court recognised the existence of West Irian Jaya. At the time of writing, the territory therefore consists of two Indonesian provinces: Papua and West Irian Jaya.

Because the term Papua can be taken to refer to the Indonesian province of Papua, it could be confusing to use the term Papua for the entire territory. This Comment therefore uses the term West Papua.

CIIR's position on West Papua

For CIIR, our commitment to human rights and justice compels us to support Papuans in their struggle for justice, peace and human rights.

We recognise that the struggle for justice in West Papua is not a struggle of the Papuan people alone. International organisations, governments and economic interests share responsibility for the situation in West Papua today, and should also be held accountable.

Our support for victims of injustice in West Papua is not simply solidarity, but awareness of a shared responsibility for the conditions that lead to injustice in West Papua. We recognise the need for action to address these causes of injustice, bring about resolution of the political conflict over Papuan sovereignty, and lay the foundations for a just peace.

We recognise that:

- Papuans will not feel justice has been served until they are given an opportunity for self-determination.
- A political solution to the dispute over Papuan sovereignty alone will not bring justice. Parallel to resolution of the political conflict,

there must be a process to establish broad-based justice and create sustainable conditions for sustainable peace and development.

- To this end, we see the need for efforts to build the foundations of peace, justice and development by fostering respect for human rights and responsibilities, a democratic culture, tolerance, pluralism, as well as good governance and citizenship.
- The process toward building the foundations of peace and justice must dismantle the structures of injustice (including legal and policy frameworks), restore damaged relationships and bring about changes in the attitudes and behaviours of individuals.
- We believe the process should bring about change at all levels of society, with particular effort to engage women and marginalised groups.

Our goal is for the people of West Papua to enjoy justice and respect for human rights as the foundation of sustained peace and development. We aim to:

- promote the capacity and opportunity of civil society organisations, in particular faith-based organisations, in West Papua and Indonesia to advocate for justice and ensure respect for human rights in West Papua
- generate political will among governments, regional bodies and international organisations to encourage greater accountability for the situation in West Papua by the Indonesian government and other stakeholders
- encourage international accountability for the situation in West Papua.

A core principle of CIIR's approach to advocacy is that we will never replace our partners' voices. We are committed to the belief that Papuans are their own best advocates. CIIR's role in advocacy for peace and human rights in West Papua seeks to support partners in promoting the effectiveness and reach of their advocacy work, and to help amplify their voices in the North.

Injustice has been able to flourish in Papua because it has been a little known part of the world. This Comment has been published to help raise awareness of the situation in West Papua. See www.ciir.org for more information and ideas on what you can do to support the struggle for peace with justice in West Papua.

Notes

- ¹ This account draws on Decki Natalis Pigay, *Evolusi nasionalisme dan sejarah konflik politik di Papua* (The evolution of nationalism and the history of political conflict in Papua), Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000.
- ² See Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: The obliteration of a people*, London: Tapol, p16. The ensuing account also draws on this book.
- ³ Brian May, *The Indonesian tragedy*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p178, quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua*, p23.
- ⁴ See 'Indonesia's 1969 takeover of West Papua not by "Free Choice": ... Secret files show US support for Indonesia', July 2004, available on the website of the National Security Archive www.nsarchive.org (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB128/index.htm).
- ⁵ Article XVII of the New York Agreement, quoted by John Saltford, *United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969*, lecture delivered in 1999 (available online at www.westpapua.net/docs/books/book0/un_wp.doc). The ensuing account of the conduct of the Act of Free Choice also relies on this text.
- ⁶ See Direktorat Organisasi Internasional Departement Luar Negeri (Directorate of international organisation at the department of foreign affairs), *Sejarah kembalinya Irian Jaya ke pangkuan Republik Indonesia* (History of Irian Jaya's return to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia), Jakarta, 1998, p7. See also Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Irian Barat (Regional government of West Irian province), *Penentuan pendapat rakyat di Irian Barat* (Determination of people's opinion in West Irian), Jayapura, 1972, p510.
- ⁷ Quoted in John Saltford (as above), p18.
- ⁸ See S Lekik, 'Historic vote was a sham: Ex-UN chief admits', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 November 2001.
- ⁹ Personal testimony to the author by a Papuan who is a member of the Indonesian army.
- ¹⁰ Papuan people in Enarotali, the capital of Paniai district, know about this story.
- ¹¹ See Benny Giay, *Menuju Papua Baru: Beberapa pokok pikiran sekitar emansipasi orang Papua* (Some thoughts on the emancipation of the Papuan people), Jayapura: Elsham and Deiyai, 2000, p7.
- ¹² See Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's secret war: The guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985, p71.
- ¹³ From an account published in the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraf* in 1974, quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua*, pp79-80.
- ¹⁴ See Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's secret war*, p71 and p50.
- ¹⁵ See Budiardjo and Liong, *West Papua*, pp82-84.
- ¹⁶ Amnesty International Public Statement, 'Indonesia: On the fourth anniversary of the Abepura raids, impunity remains entrenched in Papua', 6 December 2004.

- ¹⁷ 'Appeal to the international community over the devastating Puncak Jaya operation and wider destabilising political developments in West Papua' issued 21 December 2004 by a coalition of West Papuan church, human rights and student organisations and tribal councils.
- ¹⁸ See for example 'Statement on violence, abductions and killings in Mulia Puncak Jaya, September-November 2004', press release by Solidaritas Nasional Untuk Papua (National Solidarity for Papua – a Jakarta-based non-governmental organisation), 22 November 2004.
- ¹⁹ See Elizabeth Brundige et al, *Indonesian human rights abuses in West Papua: Application of the law of genocide to the history of Indonesian control*, paper prepared for the Indonesian Human Rights Network by the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, April 2004.
- ²⁰ See Chris Ballard, 'The denial of traditional land rights in West Papua', *Cultural Survival Quarterly* Vol 26 No 3, 2002, available online at www.minesandcommunities.org.
- ²¹ For more on the involvement of the Indonesian military in violence against the Papuans in connection with natural resources exploitation, see for example *Indonesia: Resources and conflict in Papua*, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002 (www.crisisgroup.org).
- ²² 'Land, natural resources and environment: A resolution of the indigenous people of the Amungme tribe' published in *Timika*, 10 December 1998, p1.
- ²³ See Denise Leith, 'Freeport's troubled future', *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2001, available at www.insideindonesia.org.
- ²⁴ See Agus Sumule, 'Protection and empowerment of the rights of indigenous people of Papua (Irian Jaya) over natural resources under special autonomy: From legal opportunities to the challenge of implementation', *Resource Management in Asia Pacific Working Paper No 30*, 2002.
- ²⁵ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human development report 2002*.
- ²⁶ Dennis Blair and David Phillips, *Indonesia Commission: Peace and progress in Papua*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, p76.
- ²⁷ See Chris Green, 'Spread of AIDS in Papua at alarming level', *The Jakarta Post*, 3 October 2002.
- ²⁸ See Leslie Butt, *The Papuan sexuality project*, FHI (Family Health International) Indonesia, February 2002.
- ²⁹ See Nethy Dharma Somba, 'HIV/AIDS cases continue to soar in Papua province this year', *The Jakarta Post*, 13 April 2004.
- ³⁰ See UNDP, *Human development report 2002*, and Badan Pusat Statistik Irian Jaya (The government office for statistics in Irian Jaya), *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1998*, Jayapura, 1999.
- ³¹ See Stephanus Kakisina, 'Development in the land of Papua: For whom?', paper submitted to roundtable on human rights in West Papua at the Orville H Schnell Jr Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, 25 March 2002.

- ³² From statistics provided by the Papuan Provincial Administration quoted by Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar in 'Interfaith communion to make Papua Land of Peace', a paper presented at a discussion on interfaith collaboration for peace in West Papua held in Geneva, 31 March 2005.
- ³³ Figures taken from an article in *Kompas*, 4 November 2002. Subsequent information in this section on migrants in West Papua is also drawn from this source.
- ³⁴ See 'West Papua: Secret operation launched to undermine and destroy all pro-independence activities', Tapol (the Indonesia human rights campaign) news release, 12 October 2001 (www.gn.apc.org/tapol).
- ³⁵ 'Army chief praises murderers as heroes' in *Laksamana.net*, 24 April 2003.
- ³⁶ Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia, press release dated 2 March 2000.
- ³⁷ For further analysis see Denise Leith, *The politics of power: Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003. See also *Indonesia: Resources and conflict in Papua*, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002 (www.crisisgroup.org), pp17-22.
- ³⁸ See Denise Leith, 'Freeport's troubled future', *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2001, available at www.insideindonesia.org.
- ³⁹ See for example S Powell, 'West Papua mine paid \$18.5m to military', *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 March 2003.
- ⁴⁰ See John McBeth, 'Turning on Tangguh', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 August 2004.
- ⁴¹ See Dennis Blair and David Phillips, *Indonesia Commission: Peace and progress in Papua*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003.
- ⁴² See the Thirty-Fourth Pacific Islands Forum Communique paragraph 74, available at www.mfat.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/communique.html.
- ⁴³ See the text adopted by the European Parliament on the 'Situation in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh province', paragraph M, June 2003.
- ⁴⁴ See 'Indonesia: Council conclusions', paragraph 2 (ii) from the General Affairs press release of the 2346th Council meeting, 14/15 May 2001, available at the Council of the European Union website (<http://ue.eu.int>).
- ⁴⁵ *Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Papua: Manifesto hak-hak dasar rakyat Papua*, Jayapura, 28 February 2002, Point No 8.
- ⁴⁶ For more on the role of NGOs in West Papua, see Yohanes Bonay and Jane McGrory, 'West Papua: Building peace through an understanding of conflict' in Heijmans, Simmonds and Van de Veen (eds), *Searching for peace in Asia Pacific: An overview of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities*, London: Lynne Reiner, 2004, pp452-453.



West Papua: The struggle for peace with justice

Since Indonesia assumed control of the territory of West Papua in 1963, indigenous Papuans have been denied a genuine opportunity for self-determination and have suffered the ongoing neglect of their socio-economic, cultural and human rights.

In this Comment, Neles Tebay, a Papuan priest and journalist, argues that Papuans are now facing a real threat to their survival. He outlines the past and present injustices suffered by indigenous Papuans, and describes the peace-building work that offers the only real hope for the Papuan people that they will not forever have to live as outsiders in their own land.



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