
Prepared for:

**Tim Aldred**
Head of Policy and Communications
Progressio UK

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By: Catherine Sexton
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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A4ID</td>
<td>Advocates for International Development</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>Advocacy Project Plan</td>
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<td>AMR</td>
<td>Advocacy Monitoring Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVAAZ</td>
<td>AVAAZ.org – The World In Action (international action website)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Environmental Movement of Campamento (Honduras partner)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>the Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoE</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>Olancho Environmentalist Movement (Honduras partner)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoE</td>
<td>Portfolio of Evidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp; A-LAC</td>
<td>Policy and Advocacy Officer, Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Progressio Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Programme Partnership Arrangement with DFID</td>
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<td>RICA</td>
<td>Regular Impact and Capacity Assessment</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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Summary of Findings and Recommendations

The Review found that the goal of Progressio’s illegal logging Advocacy Policy Plan (April 2008 – March 2011) was highly relevant, both to the external context, and to Progressio’s own strategy. The goal remained relevant throughout and has been largely achieved. The change clearly cannot be attributed to Progressio alone; they were one of many parties who contributed to the passing of the EU legislation banning the placing of illegally logged timber on the EU market for the first time in October 2010.

However, Progressio made a clear and acknowledged contribution to the passing of the legislation, and to the inclusion of several key aspects in the legislation. They achieved this through appropriate strategies, well-researched and presented evidence and timely and close following of a highly technical legislative process. It was clear who the organisation was trying to influence, and Progressio developed strong and mutually beneficial relationships with the EU Special Rapporteur for the Environmental Sub-Committee and DEFRA in the UK. Staff identified a clear opportunity and pursued it, with great commitment and professionalism. This work has succeeded in building Progressio’s reputation as a credible and capable advocacy and campaigning organisation, in places where it was previously less known.

The combination of the policy/advocacy work and the mini-campaign led to a very strong outcome for Progressio and for those whose livelihoods are blighted by illegal logging. Progressio was able to exert influence in the policy change processes in which they engaged because they were able to establish credibility. The two main reasons for this were found to be their approach, and the authenticity and validity of their case.

Although the goal was achieved there was a significant change in strategy which took place early on in the life of the Advocacy Project Plan. As it became clear that the EU process was a more relevant path to achieving the goal, so the Plan pursued first Objective 3, and then, through this, opportunities were presented to pursue certainly Objective 2, in the UK at least, and finally some parts of Objective 1, alliance-building, became more relevant as an approach.

There is one significant weakness in the work which lay largely beyond Progressio’s control. The incentive to pursue this goal was very strongly rooted in evidence of the social impact of illegal logging on the lives of Progressio partners and beneficiaries, and relevant partners were able to provide much of this evidence to support Progressio’s case. However, as the work progressed and became more targeted at the EU process, so partner links weakened as partners were no long able to continue working on this topic with Progressio. As a result, what emerged was an engagement with a highly technical legislative process, the mechanics of which became ever further removed from the realities of beneficiaries, at least. The important point to remember here though is that the result was not. What has been achieved through this advocacy and lobbying work will have a direct impact on the lives of many of those whom Progressio seeks to represent and serve. Progressio is well placed to follow-this through and ‘square the circle’ in engaging with and monitoring this impact, but whether it chooses to do so is a matter of deciding how best to use organisational resources.

This Review has highlighted many advantages to having strong partner and beneficiary evidence in making a case for policy change and campaigning, but does not recommend that Progressio takes a position on this, only that opportunities are sought to develop and maintain these links in order to engage supporters and to build a stronger case. Through the work of this and previous reviews and evaluations, Progressio staff is only too aware of the advantages and some of the difficulties and the Review has found that they are striving to ensure these are identified and addressed in each new policy and campaigns undertaking.
The Review has also found that the staff concerned carried a great deal of responsibility and were also allowed to show a great deal of initiative, and were supported by other staff and organisational structures. However, as Progressio experiences the pressure to be more outward facing and to develop a stronger and more visible supporter base, work of this nature could be strengthened and better supported by a more formal cross-organisational group comprised of those involved. This would ensure wider organisational understanding and ownership particularly as Progressio structures evolve and internationalise.

As Progressio’s capacity to undertake public campaigning grows, the Review has found that this has been an excellent opportunity to explore and develop both that capacity and to reflect on what Progressio seeks to achieve through its campaigns work. Further, cross-organisational reflection on this can only support the direction of this growth.

The Review was also asked to consider lessons learning within Progressio and has found much evidence of this, and quotes extensively from the organisation’s own monitoring system to demonstrate this. There is also clear evidence of many of these reflections being put into practice in new advocacy and campaigns work currently being planned. As the public campaigns work grows, it needs to be integrated into monitoring and impact assessment systems quickly, but appropriately, seeking ways to involve as many as realistic, in order that the organisation understands the opportunities and benefits such work offers.

The Review recommends

- that Progressio examine proposed advocacy and policy work to ensure a supporter focus, and identify possible opportunities for connecting with supporters, particularly in relation to encouraging personal behaviour change
- that Progressio undertakes some reflection on why it wants to campaign and what it wants to achieve from it, and ensures that the results of these reflections are widely shared and understood
- that Progressio develops a formal planning format for Campaigns work, and also baselines and indicators of change. Also, that Progressio attempts to make its own theories of change explicit in campaigns, policy and advocacy planning, in a way which shows the role of the Development Worker. Planning and strategic thinking should be as participatory as possible, and should attempt to elicit ideas of what success looks like for the different organisational functions involved.
- that Progressio develops mechanisms for real time, participatory monitoring of public campaigns work
- that the role and composition of the Advocacy Strategy Group be reviewed in the light of evolving structural changes within Progressio, in order to ensure that it is fit for purpose
- that Progressio explore the idea of ‘virtual’ and/ or cross-organisational task teams to deliver each Advocacy Project Plan, working across international structures and led by the Policy & Advocacy Officer involved
- that Progressio continues to have some involvement in work in Honduras and Central America which will help it in understanding and demonstrating, in the future, the impact of this work, and thus ‘squaring the circle’
Section 2: Introduction and Methodology

2.1 Project Overview

Progressio began its advocacy and campaigns work on illegal logging with the approval of and international Advocacy Project Plan (APP) in February 2008, which ran from April 2008 to March 2011. A follow up plan tracking the implementation of EU legislation at UK level is now running until 2012. Work under the initial APP included collaboration with pro-bono lawyers through Advocates for International Development and focussed largely on lobbying for legislation banning the placing of importing of illegally logged timber onto the EU market for the first time. There were two mini-campaigns (September 2008; June-July 2010) involving supporters. Official submissions were made to DEFRA and to the Special Rapporteur for the Environment Sub-committee at the European Parliament, and there was other lobbying at EU and UK level.

The key staff member involved was the Policy and Advocacy Officer for Latin and Central America (P&A LAC), who worked with other staff, particularly in communications, campaigns and international programmes. Initial line support was provided by the Regional Manager for LAC, and then by the Advocacy Manager, as the post was re-located in this team. The Advocacy Strategy Group (ASG) was responsible for overseeing the initial development of the APP and its approval, and later the management of the whole advocacy and campaigns work.

2.2 Methodology

The broad aim of the work is to review the planning and implementation of policy and campaigns work, (based on the illegal logging APP). The objective is to provide an independent assessment of how, through this APP, the work of Progressio has contributed to the overall goal relating to illegal logging which is “The European Community and the member states ensure that the timber traded (import and export) within the European Community comes from legal, sustainable and well managed forest sources in developing countries to help secure the rights of poor people who rely on forests for their livelihoods.” The reviewer was asked to use the 2008 – 2011 Advocacy Project Plan as the basis for the evaluation.

Some elements of this work have already been reviewed as part of earlier evaluations, so this review is intended to collate and present existing learning and consider additional information where there are gaps. The methodology for the evaluation is clearly set out in the Terms of Reference, which can be found in Annex 5.

The work was carried out between the end of August and the end of October 2011 and consisted of a number of stages:

- A review of key documents related to the Advocacy, Policy and Campaigns work on illegal logging, and of the extensive Portfolio of Evidence, supplied by Progressio UK and the identification and review of further documents during the evaluation.
- Skype/Telephone interviews with key Progressio staff and supporters and contacts.
- Production of a draft report for initial comments by Progressio staff.
- Revision of the final report and submission to Progressio.

The full list of people interviewed and key documents consulted can be found in Annexes 1 and 2.
It should be noted that the number of interviews conducted for this Review is relatively small. This is for due reasons. Firstly, many of the staff and key contacts both in Progressio and externally have now moved on and were not available for interview. Secondly, as the Terms of Reference state, this was essentially a desk review, drawing on previous evaluations conducted and the extensive Portfolio of Evidence now available for this work. Several of the interviews referred to were conducted as part of previous evaluations of Progressio UK and Progressio Ireland work carried out by the reviewer previously.
Section 3: The role of the Advocacy Project Plan

3.1 Mandate and relevance

The overall goal of the APP: “The European Community and the member states ensure that timber traded (import & export) within the European Community comes from legal, sustainable and well managed forest sources in developing countries to help secure the rights of poor people who rely on forest for their livelihood” was found by the reviewer to be very much in line with Progressio’s mandate. It contributed directly to two of the Themes and Goals of Progressio 2005 – 2010 Strategic Plan i.e. those relating to Effective civil society participation for change and Ensuring sustainable Environment. The period of the APP crossed over into Progressio’s current Strategic Framework, and again, makes a direct contribution certainly towards the Sustainable Environment Goal, and also several of the Organisational Objectives, and Key Progress Indicators relating to building an effective supporter base. This work of the APP is in line with both the previous and current PPA funding agreements with DFID.

The question of the relevance of the APP is partly answered through its relevance to Progressio’s own strategy. It was assessed through the research conducted by Hayes and Larrain (2008) as a highly relevant and indeed urgent issue to be addressed. Other indicators include the willingness of other international agencies such as WWF to work on this issue at international level and that bodies such as Chatham House consider Illegal logging to be sufficiently important to warrant a dedicated website (http://www.illegal-logging.info), which is funded by DFID. Relevance as judged by supporters is addressed later in the report.

The overall Goal of the APP remained the same throughout period of the intervention, although once RICA was introduced, it became the ‘policy change objective’. However, it became clear during the first year of the APP that the three Objectives/Phases were unlikely to remain relevant and suitable. The most significant change to these Objectives occurred in the first few months after the APP was approved in February 2008.

In early 2008, the P&A-LAC worked closely with the Advocacy Strategy Group (ASG) to produce an advocacy strategy, which became the APP, to guide work towards the overall goal. The original analysis had focussed on UK legislation, as the EU process was thought to be moribund at the time. The ASG had wanted to build a coalition or alliance of organisations who were also interested in policy change on timber procurement, in both the UK and Ireland, to form a working group with a common terms of engagement and Action Plan. This was the Phase/Year 1 objective: “To develop a UK and Ireland wide working group to work jointly on the issue of illegal logging”, and Phase/Year 2, “The UK and Ireland adopts primary legislation that put an end to the import of illegally obtained or purchased timber”.

However, once Progressio began scoping and mapping other relevant organisations, they realised that these organisations were reasonably content with the self-regulatory processes in place in the UK and strengthening UK legislation was not a priority for them.

It also became clear that the UK government of the time was not committed to pursuing a change in UK legislation. Progressio research identified that Barry Gardiner MP was putting forward a Private Member’s Bill on illegal logging (supported between May and September 2008 by a Progressio Urgent Action email and letter campaign directed towards Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, then the Secretary of State) which began its progress in the House of Commons in 2008, but was quickly defeated due to a lack of interest. Progressio realised at this time that, without significant public lobbying, the UK government was unlikely to prioritise a change in UK legislation.

Progressio partners however, were saying that although some companies in the UK, for example Habitat and IKEA, were self-regulating, others were not and that the UK, along with Italy was continuing to be a major market for illegally logged timber.

There was an option at this point, and with this new information, for Progressio to have reviewed its position and decided either to mount an action directed at the UK government, or to re-think the strategy entirely. There is no clear written record of why and how the decision was taken at the time. Fortuitously, at this point, further research uncovered the possibility of an emerging process at EU level. A report commissioned in 2002 had provided the impetus for the EU to take this forward, but the resulting process of developing new legislation had stalled. However, with the amendment of the Lacey Act in the US in May 2008, there was renewed pressure on the EU to reconsider its own legislation on the issue and Progressio realised that at that point in time, their energies could usefully be directed at the EU process. Other agencies, such as Greenpeace, FoE and WWF were interested in picking up the EU process, and there was a stronger possibility of joint working at this level. The outcome of this was that both Phases/Objectives 1 and 2 of the APP (originally meant to be implemented between April 2008 and March 2010) were only implemented during the initial three months and the APP had to be adapted. This was recorded in the first AMR (April – October 2009) The EU started moving pretty quickly so Progressio had to accelerate its own pace as well and the APP ‘fast-forwarded’ to Phase/Objective 3: “The EU adopts primary legislation that puts an end to the import of illegally obtained or purchased timber(wood).”

3.2 Building an alliance

Research conducted for the Hayes and Larrain report of 2008 provided the evidence which influenced Progressio to take a position of calling for full prohibition on the import of illegally logged timber. Interviews conducted with WWF staff, and also with Progressio’s own advocacy staff revealed that initially there had been a difference of opinion between Progressio and certainly WWF, if not with some of the other environmental organisations and their lobbying positions. All wanted a complete prohibition, but WWF and others felt that this was not a pragmatic position; they didn’t believe that complete prohibition was achievable at that time.

Progressio’s first AMR of 2009 highlighted a significant delay in the process of the European Council developing a position: “In correspondence with Caroline Lucas, her office confirmed that ‘the European Council is unfortunately unlikely to reach political agreement on the due diligence regulation in June, as had been promised / expected’. This is a clear demonstration of serious disagreements in Brussels and at member state levels on the adoption of this legislation…. The fact that there is already a proposal at EU level has changed the dynamics and the policy context, which required changes in approach rather than in objectives. Rather than consolidating alliances at this stage, it is important to push for keeping the process moving forward together with a closer engagement with policy and decision makers.” Consequently Progressio worked very independently from the other INGOs making their own submissions independently from WWF and others. In retrospect, WWF staff has agreed that Progressio’s position was more realistic than had been thought, and consequently feel that more be achieved Progressio worked more proactively in alliance with others.

Considering the scale and significance of external contextual factors revealed through research undertaken by Progressio in the early stages of the APP, it is to its credit that the organisation felt able to move away from the original objectives set out in the APP. It is not that Objectives 1 and 2 were irrelevant in themselves, but that the external context, in the UK

2 Interview with Osvaldo Vasquez as part of this Review.
4 For this Review and also for the DFID PPA evaluation August 2010
at least – there was some movement in Ireland - was such that it would have been difficult to work on them directly. The environment for working on legislative processes at an EU level was however, more conducive to being able to achieve the change which was at the heart of the overall APP Goal. What this Review has revealed however, is that although Objectives 1 and 2 were not perhaps practicable at the time, they later came into their own as Progressio built relationships with the UK government which were strategic to achieve the EU level change. The very relationships which Progressio built in order to achieve Objective 3 (in the UK at least) then enabled it to exert considerable influence in bringing about Objective 2, whilst Objective 1, as an approach, was no longer deemed appropriate.

3.3 Use of the APP as a ‘monitoring’ document for the Review

The Review has encountered difficulties in using the APP as the primary monitoring document upon which to base a judgement as to whether Progressio achieved the stated Goal/policy change objective. There are several reasons for this:

a) Due to reasons explained above, Objective 1 quickly became irrelevant and although significant progress was actually made on Objective 2, this was not achieved through the means indicated in the APP.

b) The APP was developed under a previous monitoring framework, which was then superseded by RICA and the Advocacy Monitoring Reports (AMRs). Under the previous monitoring system, there was no ‘Portfolio of Evidence’ (PoE). However, as RICA was available from mid-2009, with the AMRs and PoE, the reviewer has drawn on the various AMRs and extensive PoE on which to base assessment from April 2009 onwards.

c) The APP was never re-written, or adapted, nor changes made recorded in an evolving document, because of the evolving monitoring system. However, there were additional pieces of work taken on, including submissions to the UK government during consultation on the EU FLEGT process and the UK timber procurement policy. The work with Progressio Ireland is considered separately.

The Review then has taken the approach of focussing on successes and challenges of the outcomes and the work done.
Section 4: What went well?

One interviewee commented; “despite the difficulties, it has not been a history of frustration...but has had a remarkable outcome” and went on to salute the perseverance and commitment of the staff involved.

4.1 “A remarkable outcome”: The passing of the EU legislation (April – Oct 2010)

Direct attribution is notoriously difficult to claim in advocacy work yet Progressio's contribution to the passing of EU legislation prohibiting the importing of illegally logged timber into the EU market is marked and noted by many of the parties involved. Progressio can claim credit for identifying the opportunity and making a judgement about the best use of their resources and seeing an opportunity to add to and improve an initiative that was taking place. i.e. they understood their comparative advantage and used it well. Work then began on 2 fronts:

1) Seeking ‘champions’ within the EU who were interested in working on this legislation and identified with Caroline Lucas, MEP, who at the time was Special Rapporteur to the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on the Environment, Public health and Food Safety

2) Working through and with DEFRA to influence the UK government’s position on and support to strengthening the legislation at EU level. Seeking the support of the DEFRA Secretary of State, first the Rt. Hon Hilary Benn MP and later the Rt. Hon. Caroline Spelman MP, Progressio worked on worked on 3 submissions to DEFRA, on the EU processes and later on the UK government's own timber procurement policy.

The original proposals in the EU had not been explicit in calling for full prohibition, or a Due Diligence System but had placed the onus on traders to ensure authorised provenance in a self-regulating system. At the time, other NGOs active on the issue, such as Greenpeace and WWF were supporting this position, as they thought anything stronger was unrealistic. Nonetheless, Progressio set out to lobby for a tougher regulation. By providing technical support and drafting assistance to the EU Special Rapporteur to the Environment Sub-Committee, with assistance from Antonia Horrocks (Shearman & Sterling LLP) through A4ID, Progressio engaged on a technical level with the EU process. The process of adopting a new EU regulation is multi-step and Progressio’s strategy was to closely shadow the Co-Decision process through to the Second Reading of the Bill, the triadogue negotiations with the Council of Ministers and European Commission and the final vote on the Regulation by the Environment Sub-Committee on behalf of political groups of the European Parliament and the separate vote by the European Council.

In May 2009 Progressio made contact with the office of the Special Rapporteur, Caroline Lucas MEP. In correspondence, her office confirmed that “the European Council is unfortunately unlikely to reach political agreement on the due diligence regulation in June, as had been promised / expected”. This pointed to serious disagreements in Brussels and at member state levels on the adoption of this legislation and had the effect of slowing down the Brussels process. The Council’s position then led to a watering down of the legislation proposal in Dec 2009 and the elimination of the prohibition clause (cf Caroline Lucas Press Release Dec 2009). Prior to that point, there had been strong support from DEFRA, MEPs and the UK Timber Trade Federation concerning the inclusion of a prohibition clause and criminal sanctions in the EU legislation proposal. However there was strong lobbying by the other EU timber sectors as well as strong opposition by certain EU member states (i.e. Germany, France).
As a result, Progressio lobbied the office of the Special Rapporteur to the Environment Sub-Committee and other MEPs to propose the re-introduction of vital clauses and produced supporting documents to strengthen the discussions with other Environment Sub-Committee members. This was reflected in the Environment Sub-Committee’s proposed amendments to the Council document, voted on in early May 2010.

On July 5th 2010, the EU Parliament (Parliamentary Commission) voted for the second time to approve the prohibition clause. This was followed by the second reading vote by the Environment Sub-Committee of the European Parliament. The legislation was finally ratified in October 2010 and became Regulation (EU) no 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, banning the placing of illegally logged timber on the EU market from 2013. This will only apply to timber at the point when it is placed on the market i.e. for the first time. If illegal timber is on the EU market it will be legal to buy or sell it, although traders will have to keep records of their suppliers & customers. The EU is also now agreeing Voluntary Partnership Agreements with timber exporting countries that seek to promote effective forest governance. The legislation also established the introduction of robust EU-wide supply chain monitoring mechanisms. The next phase is the implementation of the legislation by the EC and Member States.

4.2 Relationships with the Special Rapporteur to the Environment Sub-Committee and other Environment Sub-Committee members

Having identified the Special Rapporteur as a key ally and link to the Environment Sub-Committee, the P&A-LAC, in particular, set about developing excellent working relationships with her and other key members of the Sub-Committee. Progressio first made contact in mid-2009 and over the following year, the relationship appears to have developed into one based on mutual respect and trust, and that was benefit to both. Progressio’s approach featured a combination of regular face-to-face meetings and telephone calls together with strong submission documents, all of which enabled Progressio to establish their credibility, despite not having an office in Brussels.

The email correspondence over the period September 2009 to June 2010, and other documents provided in the PoE show the high level of respect accorded to Progressio, the value placed on their support and the appreciation of the quality of the various submissions over this period. The correspondence features regular expressions of gratitude for “extremely useful” and “really invaluable” input but also evidence of a deeper level of engagement. During the period April/May 2010, when Progressio organised supporters to send emails to lobby MEPs, the good intelligence deriving from this working relationship enabled the supporter action to be well worded and targeted. Progressio staff were able to be briefed regularly on the progress of legislation at a high level of detail, allowing Progressio’s lobbying to be timely, specific and detailed. There is also clear evidence of the Special Rapporteur having been influenced by Progressio’s inputs, particularly on the issue of a full prohibition, and a clear appreciation of the submissions and comments provided by Progressio’s pro bono legal advisor gave Progressio good credibility before relevant policy makers. Many of Progressio’s proposals are reflected in the ‘amendment’ to legislation documents.

Progressio made a wise choice at the time to seek to influence the EU parliament and not the Commission more widely. They do not have an office in Brussels and had to make a decision about how best to their limited resources. Their route into the Commission was quite weak but there was the potential to lobby the Parliament through Caroline Lucas and other MEPs and key voting moments. Furthermore, due to the stage of the EU legislation at the time, it was judged more productive to influence the EU parliament. Progressio therefore prioritised influencing the EC through work with Caroline Lucas and also through DEFRA to the Council of Ministers – through DEFRA.
4.3 Establishing a relationship with DEFRA

The second key strand of Progressio’s strategy for achieving change within the EU was to lobby the UK government, through DEFRA, to support strengthening of the EU legislation proposals. Progressio first made contact with DEFRA very early on in the APP period, signing a joint letter with other organisations expressing support for Barry Gardiner MP’s Private Member’s bill on illegal logging. Although the bill failed to precede through to a second stage, due to a lack of government support, Progressio then became one of the only development NGOs regularly consulted by DEFRA on policy relating to illegal logging.

The then DEFRA Secretary of State, the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, was personally in favour or stronger legislation, and was concerned about the EU process, so was initially a good ally. Progressio were concerned that this route might be closed to them after the May 2010 general election. However, despite the change of government, there has not been a need to change the policy focus. Indeed, the Conservative party included in their manifesto and Coalition Agreement a specific commitment to ban illegal logging from the UK, which became a further opportunity for Progressio.

Over the next 2 years, Progressio was consulted and provided feedback on 3 separate issues: the adoption of EU legislation on timber; the review of Public Procurement Procedures in the UK (on the inclusion of social criteria in the application of the timber procurement policy – July 2009) and also to comment on the implementing regulations of the FLEGT system (September 2009).

The consultation on the adoption of EU legislation on timber included an invitation from DEFRA to a closed meeting with all stakeholders including the business sector and a written submission (testimonial/case studies and legal). Progressio was thanked for attending and for being “such an active participant” and this was followed up by an excellent response from the P& A – LAC further building the relationship. The written submission was also then acknowledged by DEFRA (June 2009): “we found the range of comments from stakeholders very useful” (re the EU), and again thanked for further submissions in November: “Thanks for all your work...the useful comments from consultees have allowed DEFRA to maintain our positive approach to engagement on this regulation – so thanks for taking the time to respond.”

In April 2010, following lobbying by Progressio, among other organisations, the UK Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) introduced new timber procurement guidelines for the UK public sector. These mean that wood imported into the UK to be used by public bodies such as local authorities, schools and hospitals must come from environmentally sustainable sources and have been produced in a socially responsible way – with respect for community tenure and forest management practices, and safeguards for forest workers’ employment rights.

Progressio featured on DEFRA’s website as an organisation campaigning against illegal logging (2009) and, furthermore, one of their case studies (on Ecuador) was featured on DFID’s website in February 2010, around the time of being invited by DFID to the Chatham House meeting on illegal timber, as a result of their engagement with DEFRA. Progressio in turn received further acknowledgement of their contribution.

In fact, all of Progressio’s written submissions were acknowledged and received valuable feedback from DEFRA. Progressio staff, in turn, wrote to DEFRA staff, thanking them for acknowledgements and invitations, and generally building the relationships. The International Advocacy Board Report of 2010 states that, following the ratification of the EU legislation, Advocacy staff met the Agriculture Minister Jim Paice MP and DEFRA Secretary of State Caroline Spelman MP at a “thank you” event also attended by Caroline Lucas MP (no longer a MEP) and Hilary Benn MP.
Since the passing of the legislation, the P&A-LAC has continued to meet with DEFRA (the implementing authority in the UK), and other groups, including the Environment Sub-Committee and the European Commission (the authority responsible for drafting the implementing regulation) to follow up Progressio’s work on the implementing regulation for the EU legislation on timber. A formal submission was made to DEFRA in January 2011, which highlighted some potential loopholes and areas to look at closely such as monitoring organisation, the interpretation of sanction and penalties, proportional response and other issues.

4.4 What enabled Progressio make a difference through these relationships?

The chain of ‘what went well’ proceeds rather like the layers of an onion. Inside the success of influencing the EU position lay the quality of the relationships established with the Special Rapporteur to the Environment Committee, and that established with the relevant DEFRA staff. Inside the success of these relationships lies the quality of the submissions prepared for both DEFRA as part of the three consultation processes, and also for the Office of the Special Rapporteur.

4.4.1 A4ID partnership

It is evident that the partnership with Advocates for International Development (A4ID) was invaluable. The quality of submissions made using the pro-bono legal services supplied by A4ID appears to have been very high, and certainly thus enhanced Progressio’s credibility and ability to influence policy processes. Progressio Ireland also benefitted from pro-bono support from A4ID in preparing the submission to Irish Aid (see below). Progressio acknowledges the value of the support provided by Shearman & Sterling LLP, and after the first submission, then retained them for a further two consultation processes.

MEPs needed very quick, point by point, clause by clause checking of wording and recommendations on what to do next. As drafts were prepared by the Environment Sub-Committee, a pro-bono lawyer would review and discuss changes with the P & A-LAC, and then via Progressio present analysis and recommendations to the Special Rapporteur’s office. In this way the Environment Sub-Committee was provided with timely analysis during the drafting process. Further testimony to the strength and effectiveness of this partnership has been provided by the fact that, in March 2011, at the A4ID Pro Bono Awards, the Legal Partner award was won by Antonia Horrocks from Shearman & Sterling LLP for her work with Progressio.

4.5 The relationship between Progressio’s advocacy work on illegal logging and partner experience.

The process of Progressio deciding to lobby for legislation on illegal logging began at a meeting with Central American partners and beneficiaries in 2004. There were calls from partners (particularly MAO, an organisation in Honduras which was a constituent member of CAM, a Progressio partner) to work directly on the issue in the region but as the situation was very difficult in Honduras, and several activists had been murdered as a result of their work, it was decided not to take this approach. However, the context in Honduras at the time was one of the main drivers for this work. Instead of working ‘directly’, in a high profile way in country, Progressio decided to look at the possibilities for influencing the position of the EU on logging.

Partner scoping was carried out as part of the Hayes and Larrain report in 2007/8. As a result of this, partners in Honduras and Ecuador were identified as suitable partners for international lobbying and able to provide case studies and testimonies to show the social impact of illegal logging, to back up Progressio’s case.
i) Progressio’s work in Honduras

Although the bulk of the in-country lobbying work took place before the beginning of the Illegal Logging APP, several interviewees for the Progressio Ireland evaluation\(^5\) suggested that Progressio’s support to partners’ advocacy and lobbying for a new Forestry Law (passed in 2007) was a point where Progressio’s work had most impact in bringing more equitable and sustainable access to resources to the socially excluded in Honduras. Progressio Development Workers and partners from the Departments of Olancho and La Paz were involved in early drafts, drawing on modern legislation from Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia, on the good relationships with the government of the time and focussing on encouraging the introduction of new environmental crimes and penalties. They submitted proposals for and comments on the Law’s regulatory aspects. Work on the regulations for implementation was interrupted by the Coup of 2009 but the regulations were finally approved in November 2010. Having achieved good results on the introduction of a forestry law in Honduras, partners called on Progressio to take further action at the European level, which they then did.

The updating of international legislation in the U.S. and the EU has had an immediate impact in Honduras. The Honduran government has requested to start negotiating a Voluntary Partnership Agreement, which is the new mechanism for selling wood into the EU, one of only 5 countries to do so to date. Anecdotal evidence and observation from beneficiaries and Development Workers suggest that there has already been a slowing down in illegal logging activities in Honduras. There are currently no plans to follow up the impact of either the national or international legislation on illegal logging in Honduras.

As a result of the work in Honduras, Progressio had access to a strong partner who was actively involved in this field, who understood the need for international lobbying and therefore could feed into the work and give direction. In also meant that Progressio was able to draw on the direct experience of partner organisations and their beneficiaries, certainly until the end of 2009 when, as a result of the coup in Honduras, it was no longer possible for Progressio to work directly with them. However, by this time, the EU process was well advanced and Progressio had been able to develop the case studies and make a strong case for the social impact of illegal logging on the lives of those affected, and to draw on this to good effect.

Progressio was also able to bring to London a Development Worker from Honduras, together with a partner – Estela Madariaga from CAM, and held events with them in London and Brussels. Staff have commented that they were an effective pair in that they were able to show how partners had achieved change in Honduras but that this work needed strong EU legislation to give it real impact.

ii) Advantages of this link with partner experience

The website, Interact and Progressio’s other publicity and campaigns materials were able to make good use of a small number of case studies which demonstrated the social impact well. Staff were also able to draw on these case studies during their ‘mini campaign’ to lobby MEPs and also in the submissions made in response to DEFRA consultations and in providing evidence to Caroline Lucas MEP and the EU Environment Sub-Committee. The consultation process with partners in Honduras and Ecuador worked efficiently, thanks to the contribution of relevant Development Workers. Their input was edited and included in the submission document (to DEFRA re the importance of a full prohibition – 2009).

The ability to make this link between policy at European level and the real impact on the lives of poor and marginalised with whom they are in contact, has been one of the factors commented on by those interviewed as part of this Review. Two members of WWF staff, both

\(^5\) Conducted by the author earlier in 2011
of whom have worked with Progressio at different stages during this advocacy work, commented that for them, this was definitely part of what Progressio ‘brought to the table: “Progressio brought the international link with Latin America and have really good stories from partners about the impact of illegal logging and also about how partners themselves have been empowered.” It seems that WWF were also able to incorporate some of these stories into their own campaign materials.

The illegal logging AMR of Nov 2010 – March 2011 states: “The case studies and testimonies provided by our country programmes continues to show synergy with our international advocacy, which continues to impress policy makers and allies, building our credibility. Several of Progressio supporters, interviewed for this also commented that the pictorial images used were very strong and the images of destruction very powerful.

An external contact interviewed for the 2010 DFID PPA evaluation commented: “Progressio uses case studies to present their evidence and make their case, showing examples of the effects of change on the ground. They feed this in. They are a useful voice – not too forceful but they draw on persuasion. They use evidence (of the practical implications) rather than opinion. All of these approaches are needed, but you are listened to more and have more effective dialogue, particularly with this new Government – if you can tell the story from your own experience.”

iii) Work with Advocacy and Communications Development Workers.

The presence of Development Workers overseas is both part of Progressio’s approach and its strength. The Development Worker placed with MAO/CAM and the Advocacy and Communications Development Worker were found by Progressio staff to be extremely helpful during the different consultation processes, both in channelling input from partners during consultations and also in providing input from their own experience. In particular they identified information and carried out interviews and research that were subsequently part of the submissions to MEPs and DEFRA. Since the ‘Learning Review’6 and the recommendation ‘A different way of working’ was written, there are now more Advocacy and Communications Development Workers (but only in LAC), who have greatly aided the Policy and Advocacy staff. This means that Progressio UK and Ireland staff now have more support in strengthening the link with partners’ work

4.6 Business links

As part of its strategy to influence the EU, and DEFRA, Progressio recognised the need to influence the private sector, seeing its potential, especially outside of the UK, to be an obstacle to strong legislation, and indeed this was seen to be true in mid-2009. The closed meeting organised by DEFRA as part of its consultation on the adoption of EU legislation, which Progressio attended, also included representatives of the business sector. As a result, the P&A-LAC sought opportunities to influence this sector, and found them through the European Retail Forum (ERRT), a space created by the European Commission for developing the dialogue amongst retailers and NGOs including consumer associations. The illegal logging AMR (April – October 2010) recognises the important role played by the forming of relationships with members of the timber trade industry as being key to achieving progress.

4.7 Campaign

In April and May 2010, Progressio, with assistance from Shearman & Sterling, prepared two documents setting out voting recommendations for the EU process. At the same time,

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Progressio undertook a mini-campaign to support the Special Rapporteur in her negotiations with Environment Sub-Committee members to ensure that vital clauses were kept within the legislation. This allowed the EU Parliament to return to the negotiating table with the Council from a strong position.

The ‘mini-campaign’ had three phases, structured to follow the 3 stages of the EU voting process taking place between May and July 2010:

Phase 1: To work through the EU Special Rapporteur and the Environment Sub-Committee to agree recommendations (i.e. a prohibition on those who import illegal timber and those who trade it) which were strong enough not to be watered down at a later stage.

Phase 2: to lobby the UK to take a strong lead within the Council of Ministers in the negotiations with the Environment Sub-Committee. At this point, strong recommendations had been agreed, and the point of this phase of the Campaign was to prevent their being watered down.

Phase 3 – to lobby MEPs to vote on the proposed legislation, through supporter action.

The success of the mini-campaign is difficult to evaluate as a ‘stand-alone’ action, as it was building very much on the strong relationships and lobbying which had already taken place. Furthermore, at the time of this evaluation, there was no overall planning document, setting out objectives and desired outcomes, against which success could be measured. The success of the campaign work can be seen within the overall advocacy/policy narrative: that the overall success of the efforts to support the Special Reporter in her negotiations with the Environment Sub-Committee members is measured through the outcome itself (the fact that the prohibition clause was kept in the legislation) and the feedback provided from Caroline Lucas’s staff (in the PoE).

Key messages were drawn up, for Phase 3 at least; urgent action emails for supporters (one of which received very positive feedback from Campaigns staff in CAFOD); a Campaign Logging Sheet, setting out the actions, suggested text and giving MEP contact details was produced to be sent to supporters and several press releases were prepared, although the take up rate of these is not known. A short Logging Campaign Report was produced after the event, showing an increase in people getting involved through the later stages of the campaign, after the action went out through AVAAZ, and 107 new people were added to Progressio’s supporter list. In Phase 1, 22% of those who received the email took action, but by Phase 3, nearly 40% of those emailed had taken action. Furthermore, 30% of those who took action on Phase 3 were unknown to Progressio i.e. someone had considered the action to be significant enough to pass it on to others, who had then taken action themselves. Furthermore, there was nearly a 40% ‘click-through’ rate on this third action. One reflection on this is that the promotion of action itself gathers more supporters. If this is the case then it would considerably strengthen the case for Progressio to undertake more campaigns work.

One successful element of the overall action was the lobbying of MEPs and their response. Progressio staff rang MEPs on the Environment Committee the week before the second reading in July 2010, asking them to vote. Staff made contact with 19 MEPs from 6 countries and over half requested copies of Progressio’s position paper, which possibly succeeded not only in influencing the MEPs, but also raised Progressio’s profile with this group. Overall, 27 MEPs responded. Among the organisations lobbying for this legislation, only Progressio, and then AVAAZ, prompted by Progressio, directed lobbying actions towards MEPs. Several of those interviewed for this evaluation, including staff and supporters, said they felt this had been a valuable approach, “hitting MEPs in real time”, being reactive and responsive, and made the point that MEPs are generally not lobbied by their constituents anywhere near as frequently as Westminster MPs and so they responded well. One supporter commented that she found “a receptive ear with MEPs – they were willing to take action...they are glad when someone asks them to do something; it
demonstrates their relevance and that they have support. It also strengthens the political link with MEPs and the EU as a force for change, so this was a good opportunity”.

Overall, the supporters interviewed were very appreciative and supportive of the action, but it has to be borne in mind that the names recommended for this Review were known and active supporters. Nonetheless, the supporters felt the action had been useful and appreciated. Particular points raised included:

- The relevance of the campaign action: all supporters interviewed felt that illegal logging was a very relevant topic both for its timing and as an awareness-raising issue. Several said that it seemed to capture a mood of the time. It felt part of a groundswell of interest in forestry in general. “There were a couple of reasons both from the local people’s point of view (destroying their land and livelihoods) and from a climate point of view - we need the world’s forests to continue. As such I think it is both important and relevant and from both views above increasingly so.”

- All supporters interviewed said that this was the right issue for Progressio on which to campaign, due to its relationship with partners: one said that previously Greenpeace and others had focussed on environmental issues but in a way that was quite distant, but here there was a very clear and tangible link – stopping the importing of illegally logged timber would have an immediate impact. This was seen both as a single issue, but also a holistic approach, as the link to Progressio’s Development Workers’ work was evident. Supporters commented that the campaign was useful as an awareness-raising exercise and a good opportunity to link this issue in with consumer issues, as well as the use of timber for public buildings.

- All supporters commented that illegal logging was a particularly easy issue to work with and to participate in (as opposed to the previous Just Add Water campaign, where both the format was more difficult to work with and the message was less clear). The issues in illegal logging were simpler, with a step by step presentation to action. Most people have some awareness of illegal logging but perhaps didn’t realise the scale of the imports to the UK.” Another stated: “From memory it was very clear and concise - the information sent out had the right amount of detail (otherwise can seem daunting). Having the human stories is very important – showing how it affects the individuals rather than just "a place". Another supporter said he contacted 11 MEPs, by email, and received 3 replies. The information provided was helpful as it enabled him undertake the action, although he had to make an effort and he felt this was seen and acknowledged by the MEPs.

Progressio featured some comments from supporters on its website, after the event, and these made similar comments: “I like the way Progressio fully explains the case before requesting action, and then sustains the focus of the campaign to its conclusion. Progressio has a track record of providing well researched but accessible briefings on important development issues”. He went on to say: “I was therefore well briefed by the time the request for a final push on MEPs came through. It was a busy time for me, so I was grateful for the easy identification of the MEPs for my region (via my postcode) and for the well worded draft message which I was happy to adopt.” All supporters said they had received feedback from Progressio, and had been made to feel that their action had made a difference.

4.8 How was it for staff?

Staff clearly experienced the campaign both as an opportunity to work across the former campaigns and advocacy ‘gap’, together for the benefit of the outcome being pursued and the organisation as a whole. The 2010 Learning Review highlighted the difficulties with the Just Add Water campaign, and showed where Progressio could address advocacy issues more effectively if campaigns and advocacy staff worked together with common objectives. All Progressio staff interviewed, whether directly involved in this initiative of not, commented that it had been an opportunity to get to know each other’s work, potential contributions and
therefore to build up trust and stronger relationships. One staff referred to a policy/campaigns staff dynamic that can often be present in organisations, and that this had been an opportunity to overcome that in a mutually beneficial way. Another commented “we do now have significantly better collaboration / synergy between policy and campaigns - a silver lining to merging teams.” One staff referred to the fact that different people had been trusted to attend meetings which previously would only have been the preserve of a Policy & Advocacy Officer, as an indicator of growing trust.

Several staff saw this as an opportunity for Progressio both to show what it can achieve through campaigning, and to improve the way that the organisation approaches campaigning. There were also comments that this had been a great experience of e-campaigning which had helped the organisation learn, and that the staff had been able to do a lot with a limited amount of materials and case studies.

4.9 The Big Forest Picnic

One consequence both of the profile of the campaign action and the relationship that had been built with WWF was the invitation from WWF to become involved in The Big Forest Picnic, an initiative run during August 2011, in conjunction with the Woodland Trust and WWF, intended to encourage supporters to think about their relationship with forests, and, from Progressio’s point of view, to keep the issue of illegal logging on their supporters’ agenda.

WWF had EU funding for awareness-raising work on forestry issues, with a very clear set of objectives and activities, yet Progressio was able to see this as an opportunity and be flexible enough both to fit in with the pre-planned nature of the event, and to see how its own work and profile could benefit from involvement. The staff member concerned at WWF commented that “it was a very complementary relationship, with Woodland Trust and WWF. Overall she recognised that Progressio have limited resources but did a good job in mobilising those resources and used them wisely e.g. producing the stories from overseas partners and the volunteer and faith network and community links. WWF commented that working with Progressio was quite refreshing; as a small organisation, they are adaptable and can work quite quickly. “Everything they brought was good, and they were very keen to work in partnership. Enjoyed working with them...they were very positive and pro-active and ‘can-do’ and have great volunteers.”

The full evaluation of the event is yet to be finalised7, but Progressio carried out its own internal lesson learning exercise. This showed some positive outcomes, such as some press coverage, a small number of useable contacts and some hard-to-find potential supporters. It also showed up the need to be clearer about what they had to contribute, and to be clearer what success looks like.

4.10 Co-operation with Progressio Ireland

The Irish government taking action on illegal logging in its own procurement policies was an integral part of the original APP. At the time, the Irish government did not have a public procurement policy. Progressio Ireland, together with Progressio UK, also lobbied the Irish government to press for legislation at EU level, and also lobbied the government and private companies based in Ireland to ensure their timber was obtained from legal sources. Progressio Ireland then worked with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the PEFC (Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification) to highlight the role of certification of sustainably logged sources. PI lobbied the Green party in Government, including the Junior Minister for Justice, who had a particular interest in this issue, and the Departments of Agriculture and Finance, with whom a good relationship was built. The work dovetailed with a process then already taking place within the Irish Government which then carried out

7 It was being carried out as this Review was submitted.
a consultation on 'green public procurement processes', focusing on accessing wood and paper from sustainable sources. Progressio Ireland have recently (2011) done another submission to the Minister on the new EU timber legislation and will be following this up with meetings, and also exploring the possibility of joint work with Trocaire on this issue.

Specific outcomes, to which Progressio Ireland contributed, were that some of the private sector companies lobbied changed their procurement policy (most notably the Kingspan Group), through lobbying Al Gore, (who had significant investments in the company) to FSC and PEFC certified sources and Government is in the process of introducing new regulations on green procurement, with wood and paper sourcing as key measurables. Furthermore, the research done on Irish companies which showed that only 3% were using timber from sustainable sources (as opposed to 60% in the UK) gained some media attention and contributed to this issue being raised in public and private debates. Throughout this work, Progressio UK shared all their policy submissions and case studies with Progressio Ireland, and provided comments on related work. Progressio Ireland also benefitted from Pro Bono legal support from Shearman and Sterling, through the A4ID arrangement, in preparation of policy papers and submissions.

The main strengths of the joint work appear to have been the good policy foundation, the good cooperation between the UK policy/advocacy team and the Ireland policy staff, and the relationships built with key stakeholders. Progressio Ireland have a clear perspective on the value of this cooperation: “I think it makes the policy work stronger overall, not just because you have people working at two separate national levels, but also because it allows you to include different perspectives as the work is getting developed. It makes a great deal of sense for Progressio, as a small institution... (both the UK and Ireland) need to be making the most of any such connections. That is certainly what we are doing now on the water (and adaptation) work, and I think it will help us jointly do much stronger work.”

4.11 Key determining factors behind the success

Progressio itself is keenly aware that they made a contribution to the success at EU level, but that there were also many other contributing factors: “long-time investment in campaigning by organisations like Greenpeace, WWF and FoE on forestry issues (almost 10 years of campaigning), consumer awareness and their demand for ethical-traded wood, the business sector fearful of an NGO-led public backlash (reputational risk), UK businesses interested in levelling the playing field with their European counterparts”. (AMR 2010/2011)

Nonetheless, the combination of Progressio’s policy/advocacy work and the mini-campaign led to a very strong outcome, where the work clearly made a great contribution. Progressio was able to exert influence in the policy change processes in which they engaged because they were able to establish credibility. The two main reasons for this are their approach, and the authenticity and validity of their case.

Firstly, Progressio’s approach: From early on in the APP period, they identified and built key relationships with policy and decision-makers, and worked at these relationships. They combined good relationship-building through regular communication and positive engagement, through email and phone conversations, one-to-one lobbying meetings and participation in consultation meeting. These relational and facilitative aspects were supported by strong evidence-based written submissions and being reliable in producing documents and meeting deadlines. Progressio was able to keep a very close eye on the EU process and respond to uncertain and tight deadlines, due to the way in which the negotiations were carried out within the Environment Sub-committee and with the Council.

Secondly Progressio’s role as a development organisation bringing an awareness of the impact on people’s lives. The stories provided by country programmes and the clear synergy links with international advocacy impressed policy makers and contributed to building credibility. The P & A-LAC wrote: “Progressio brings an extra-dimension to the illegal
logging discussions, which is the effect on governance and development, or what I called “the human cost of illegal logging”. It was commented on that, at a meeting with Caroline Spelman, Progressio was distinctive because they were not focussing exclusively on environmental concerns, but on people, poverty and marginalisation. As a result of the credibility established, Progressio was able to capitalise on opportunities such as the other consultations (i.e. FLEGT, Public Procurement Processes) and to build stronger relationships with other partners, such as WWF.

Finally, in this piece of work, Progressio identified and sought to tackle the whole supply chain, an approach which was identified in the 2008 Hayes and Larraín research. Their advocacy work tackled the problem from causes to consequences. The lesson here for Progressio is that, in cases like this, it is necessary to consider the whole picture in order to achieve the right policy change.
Section 5: Challenges

5.1 Rooted in partner experience?

Progressio appears to strive, in presenting its advocacy cases, to present evidence which demonstrates the social impact of the policy and any proposed change, and that where possible, this reflects partner experience. The origins of the illegal logging work are firmly located in partner concerns. It is striking then to read in one of the AMRs (October 2001 – March 2010) that “The role of the country programmes has been limited to the provision of the case studies”. There were several factors behind this:

The original research from 2008 had identified the possibilities of work with partners in Peru and Ecuador. However, the local situation in Peru was not conducive to this work. Initially there was collaboration with a partner in Ecuador, Accion Ecologica, who was able to contribute case studies and evidence. However, their work was focussed on localised monitoring of the state of the forest, and they were not engaged in national level lobbying. In 2010 the programme in Ecuador was closed, making it very difficult to explore any further collaboration or to source materials. Later advocacy work has been able to rely on the presence of Advocacy and Communications Development Workers within the region, who are able to collect materials, build partner capacity etc. but these were not yet in post at that stage.

For the early period of the work, MAO/CAM in Honduras were excellent partners, providing much of the material for case studies and visited Europe and strengthened Progressio’s lobbying efforts. In 2009 political instability in Honduras led to the withdrawal of active collaboration with this one key partner still working on illegal logging. With such a limited range of partners and only one Advocacy & Communications Development Worker newly in post to draw on, the P & A-LAC was very dependent on relationships with the relevant Country Representative and local staff who performed the role of conduit between Progressio and local partners.

Unfortunately the coup in Honduras and the gradual withdrawal from the relationship with CAM coincided with the re-structuring of the Central America management, which seems to have meant that the local staff were not as available to provide this support as might have been wished. This kind of situation then relies on negotiating to ensure that priorities and ownership of the work are commonly held, and even though the Regional Manager was copied in on all correspondence, this does not seem to have been achieved. It appears that at this stage, insufficient consideration was given to the impact of the loss of partners on the advocacy work.

At this time, the relevant AMR notes “The closure of our programmes in Ecuador as well as the noticeable changes in partners working on the environment in Honduras will have a direct impact on our illegal logging work” and “It will be necessary for country programmes to build up new partnerships with organisations working on illegal logging at local level in order to continue rooting our illegal logging work in partners’ experience, we understand that such plans are in progress.” The Honduran programme did then facilitate the development of a new relationship between a new partner, Popol Nah Tun, and the P & A-LAC, but it was at too late a stage in the APP to be able to be of much benefit to this particular campaign.

This led to a ‘drifting away’ of partner rootedness in this campaign, noted in the AMRs, by the ASG and in interviews with all staff concerned. Comments included “we could have benefitted from more partner/programme work….it ended up being weaker than we would have wanted”.

The P & A- LAC noted that “Roughly speaking, 35% of our work relies on having good partners where we can show that this work is important. Another 35% is supplying high quality documents to policy makers and 30% in good engagement”. She went on to say that she felt the work had been less effective because of the relatively limited amount of partner ‘evidence’, and that she could have done more workshops, written articles, and invited more speakers etc. Another staff member commented that when it came to doing the MEP phone-in in May 2010, they were still going back to the old case studies; they had no new information to draw on. A similar impact was noted in a review of the material used on Progressio’s website and in communications materials; that the organisation made the most of a relatively small amount of information. The point was also made by several supporters: that the material provided by Progressio was helpful; however, there could have been more stories and information from partners and direct feedback.

5.2 Engaging with technical legislation

Progressio has a long tradition of working with others to lobby for state accountability. Their competence is not in having the understanding of and presenting the specific technical aspects of issues such as the environment, HIV/AIDS etc. but in understanding and telling out what these issues mean for real people. Progressio’s traditional added value is that it brings the impact on poor people and their voices into these meetings, rather than technical or scientific analysis. In their work on illegal logging, however, they had to find the right balance of being technically robust in their work on legislative processes, and reflecting the voice of those impacted. As a result of the partnership with A4ID, they were able to put submissions into DEFRA, the EU etc., which combined good legislative practice and the reality of the impact.

In discussing the point above i.e. reduced accesses to relevant partners, interviewees all mentioned that, fortunately, due to the focus and technical nature of this work, the advocacy work wasn’t particularly dependent on partners for information or advice. In some ways this didn’t impact on the EU work as what staff needed to do was very clear and could proceed. One raised the question of whether Progressio had been pushed towards carrying out a highly technical piece of advocacy work because of the lack of partner focus. There is no record of this kind of decision being made at the time, and it would appear to be a retrospective reflection. It was raised repeatedly in the AMRs, from 2009 onwards, so there was clearly a level of awareness at the time of the implications of weakened partner links, but it is also clear that the engagement with the EU process had already begun and there had already been sufficient collaboration with partners at an earlier stage to enable Progressio to make a strong case. They were, however, reliant on other specialist organisations for technical expertise.

It would also be worth Progressio reflecting on the role of the ASG in making this decision; to what extent was it a conscious decision and who made it, where and how? There is no paper trail of the decision-making process, although it is addressed, retrospectively in the AMR. The Regional Manager LAC did arrange specialist training on engaging with EU processes for the P & A- LAC, which would indicate support.

Another question to consider is whether this apparent technical capacity to provide that level of legal analysis did not then portray Progressio as something it was not? Or is it a capacity that Progressio wishes to develop as and when needed? Developing this capacity may have led to expectations on Progressio, both internally and externally. It is interesting to note that ASG appears to have been attempting to manage these expectations by deciding that the illegal logging work would have one final year of work, ‘tying up’ the involvement with the EU and DEFRA processes.

Despite concerns expressed by some staff about the difficulties of engaging with such a technical legislative process as this and whether this is where Progressio should invest its
energy, senior managers, when asked, stated that they would take on something like this again, as a means to an end which was strategic to the organisation and to partners. They feel it has been a learning exercise and they now know where to find the specialist support to help them pursue such an advocacy objective in the future.

5.3 Linkages

Partly because of the lack of written evidence and availability of those involved at the time, particularly external contacts, the reviewer has found it difficult to reconstruct the dynamics of linkages, particularly during the earlier stages of the work. We have seen that the ASG originally wanted to approach this work through alliance-building, but that it was apparently not possible to identify common interests, during the first 18 months at least. The first illegal logging AMR (April - September 2009) states that for strategy reasons it was necessary for Progressio to forge ahead: “Rather than consolidating alliances at this stage, it is important to push for keeping the process moving forward together with a closer engagement with policy and decision-makers.” Whilst that may be true, this AMR was written at the half way point of the APP — after 18 months. The review can only ask to what extent that was sanctioned by ASG and to what extent they were comfortable with this approach. It seems to be a ‘counter-cultural’ approach for Progressio, which appears to understand the benefits of alliances in other situations. Comments from WWF indicated that they would have welcomed working more closely with Progressio from an earlier stage, and perhaps being open to having their position influenced, but they say they were unaware that Progressio was working on the issue.

At later stages in the APP, it is clear that Progressio did then develop a strong working relationship with WWF and other agencies such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the Environmental Impact Agency, and Chatham House and clearly built excellent relationships with policy and decision-makers. Perhaps again this apparent ‘going-it-alone’ approach of the early stages was the result of engaging in such a technical process, where it was indeed necessary to be very focussed on understanding and following a complex legislative focus.

5.4 The challenge of monitoring and telling the story

In reconstructing the narrative of a piece of work retrospectively over a three year time period, it is inevitable that there will be missing links. There have been several significant staffing changes over this period, such as the Head of Policy/Advocacy, the International Programmes Director, and the Head of Communications post being re-structured. As a result the make-up of the ASG also changed. RICA was only latterly adopted, and with the shifts in emphasis of the APP, information about what decisions were taken during 2008/09 and why are hard to recall and pin down. In looking back over this period, and from an external point of view, the reviewer is left asking some of the following questions:

- Why didn’t the Hayes & Larrain report of 2008 throw up the fact that the EU work had been lying dormant? Surely then the APP would have been more realistic?
- At some point, after research revealed there was a possibility of the EU process being resurrected, a decision was made to invest in this work. A decision was thus also made to shift the emphasis away from the UK work and make a significant adaptation to the APP. Who made the decision and where was it recorded?
- The April – December 2009 AMR states, in the ‘unplanned change or signs of transformation’ section, 7a, that there were serious delays, more than expected, in the EU elections and hence slow down on the progress towards an EU legislation proposal in Brussels. However, it does not mention how Progressio either did or planned to respond to this; what effect did it have on the advocacy work?
- What was the min-campaign of 2008? Despite there being some evidence of the Urgent Action undertaken, and some international press coverage, there is no real
recording of what were its aims (i.e. in a Plan) nor of whether what work was carried out met these aims.

- Despite being an integral part of the APP, why was so little media work undertaken?

The AMRs completed by the P&A-LAC since 2009 are well-written, and have been invaluable in reconstructing the ‘story’ of this work; they give a snapshot picture of things at a certain juncture, and do elicit a summary of events over the period concerned – usually 6 months, but in this case didn’t quite capture the narrative i.e. what happened and why; how did we respond to particular events; what changed as a result? There is something about the strategic shifts, and the ebb and flow that is perhaps missed when a six monthly point is captured. It is possible and likely that some of the important decisions were taken within the context of line management meetings, but there is another important player holding overall responsibility for organisational ownership of policy and advocacy work: the ASG.

5.5 The ‘Mini-campaign’

5.5.1 ‘Teething troubles’

Progressio is still relatively new to campaigning and so inevitably there were some teething troubles experienced, such as difficulties in persuading AVAAZ to use Progressio’s name; some supporters found it confusing to be asked to take action again in Phase 3 and Progressio is still unclear re the distinction between supporters, members, campaigners and to what extent individuals can be converted from one to another.

5.5.2 A lost opportunity?

A more significant issue is the lost opportunity in engaging with supporters in a way which would urge them to reflect on their own personal behaviour and lifestyle in relating to the issue of illegal logging. The connection is made at various points early on in the work, for example in the October 2008 Urgent Action, at the time of Barry Gardiner MP’s Private Members Bill. It is interesting that DEFRA itself makes reference to this issue, for example in a letter sent by a Progressio supporter in October 2008 (as part of the Urgent Action) refers to the fact that: “... consumers can unwittingly purchase wood stolen from communities,” but does not appear after that.

Whilst it is acknowledged that the links between illegal logging in Honduras and the availability of illegally logged timber in the EU could have been hard to articulate, (as the majority finds its way to the North American market), there is definitely a wider link which could have engaged supporters in a different way and may have provided a link to Progressio’s Live Simply work, and presenting a clear opportunity for solidarity, at the very least, if not for behaviour change, providing supporters with an opportunity to take action in meaningful ways. This point was made by several supporters: that the emphasis of the material provided by Progressio was on the behaviour of others i.e. the companies and individuals undertaking the illegal harvesting of timber, and not on their own.

The Review recommends that Progressio examine proposed advocacy and policy work to identify all possible opportunities for connecting with supporters, particularly in relation to encouraging personal behaviour change.

Although it has been noted above that the mini-campaign provided Progressio with valuable experience of e-campaigning, there also appears to be an on-going issue among those

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8 However, the Review recognises that with the document ‘The Supporter Journey’ and discussions being held in the organisation, Progressio is now tackling this.
supporters contacted about the value of large numbers of pro-forma emails versus individually written letters. This issue appeared on the supporter feedback section of Progressio’s website and it was raised in interviews. Phase 2 of the mini-campaign asked supporters to write individual letters to Caroline Spelman at DEFRA. 171 individually written letters were sent, and although this appears to be a low response rate from the 2,760 contacted, it is easy to speculate on the impact of 171 individual letters – not emails – having been received by DEFRA, focussing on this one technical aspect. Several supporters said they felt that those being lobbied, whether MPs or MEPs were likely to take more notice of individual letters rather than a mass of emails, as they know that a letter of phone call requires more effort. It is also perhaps a reflection worth Progressio bearing in mind; that despite its size and lack of thousands of supporters, unlike some of the bigger agencies, there is nonetheless room for it to have an impact.

5.5.3 Campaigns Planning

There appears to have been little, if any planning of campaigns work during the life of the APP. In the early stages of the APP period there was a minimal campaigning function in Progressio and therefore minimal campaigns input into the APP. Joint or cross-organisational ownership was something that developed as the campaign went along, aided

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<tr>
<th>It is recommended that Progressio undertake some reflection on overarching aims for campaigns work</th>
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<td>By the appointment of a full time Campaigns Officer, and also the restructuring which brought the Campaigns, Communications and Policy/Advocacy functions into one team. However, overall ownership has been hampered by there not having been a cross-organisational or matrix team working around the issue and no commonly held idea of what success might look like, or even variously articulated ideas of what success might look like.</td>
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<td>Undertaking some reflection on what Progressio hopes to achieve through public campaigning; what success looks like for it, might be a helpful exercise at this point in the organisation’s development. It is hoped that this can be as participatory as possible, so that ownership of the aims, and advantages of campaigning, such as building a supporter base, and developing an external profile, can be as widely understood and shared as possible. The success of Progressio’s campaigns work, and communications with supporters have a direct bearing on its ability to achieve several of the objectives and KPIs in its 2010-2015 Strategic Framework and also the PPA, and credible baselines and targets, as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be developed in order to meet these. The obvious place to start with baselines is numbers of those taking part in various actions, but a deeper understanding of why exactly Progressio engages in campaigning will enable more varied and qualitative change indicators to be developed.</td>
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<td>There was a lack of clarity as to the place of campaigning in the original APP. As a result, there was little formal planning of the mini-campaign which took place in 2010. A campaigning element features in Phases 2 and 3 of the original APP, but this was never then clarified.</td>
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<th>It is recommended that Progressio develop a planning format for individual campaigns.</th>
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<td>It is noted, however, that campaigns work has been well integrated into the planning for the Waterproof Campaign, and a format is being developed.</td>
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<td>As part of the planning process, tools such as the Force Field Analysis (FFA) and Theory of Change (ToC) pathway could prove themselves to be very useful, if not already being used. Campaigns are often beset by conflicts and cooperation between many diverse interests, both</td>
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internal and external. Issues tend to be resolved when there is a shift in the balance of forces, from one direction to the other, which seems to have happened in the EU in the early part of 2010. The FFA is useful in identifying opposing and supporting forces, and in addressing how these can be addressed and strengthened. The reviewer has prepared a retrospective FFA for the earlier stages of the overall Advocacy and Campaigns work on illegal logging, as a trial and can be found in Annex 3. It may act as an aid in developing a better understanding of what caused which issues to shift one way or another.

The Campaigns Officer undertook some work, in a personal capacity, on retrospectively fitting the mini-campaign into a ‘Change Pathway’ or ‘so that’ logical trail. In Annex 4 an attempt has been made to build on this work to show, again, retrospectively how such a pathway may have looked. The reviewer has identified what might be the longer-term outcome and three shorter-term outcomes, or pre-conditions. An accompanying ‘so-that’ change pathway would then show the steps to be taken to reach these outcomes. Although the ToC can be restrictive as a model, and is highly linear, thus making it difficult to represent the complexity and general ‘messiness’ of change work, it could be of benefit to the initial thinking and planning processes. It is useful not only in building cross-organisational ownership, but could potentially really help Progressio in articulating what it believes change is, and how it may take place, in particular perhaps in articulating the role and place of Development Workers in the change process, something that it seems to struggle to articulate. The reviewer has seen the new Waterproof campaign and the improved planning format, but still feels there would be benefit in Progressio working through this articulation of change exercise.

It may also be useful, during the planning stage, to articulate what success might look like, not only for the organisation itself, and the policy change objective, but for each of the teams/functions involved. What success looks like will vary for each party involved – campaigns, policy, advocacy, programmes and senior management. What might the difference say about Progressio, and how can that difference be utilised and built upon?

The campaigns work has yet to be fully integrated into RICA, although it is understood that this work has begun. The Campaigns Officer, nonetheless, did trial various review mechanisms. After the mini-campaign, he wrote a ‘Post logging’ blog on the website with some reflections on how the process went and produced a ‘Logging Campaign Report’ with some analysis of the response rates. After the Big Forest Picnic, he conducted an internal review, and it is understood that a more formal evaluation of this is being carried out in conjunction with WWF and the Woodland Trust. Clearly quantitative response rates are important, but campaign successes and lesson learning needs to be set within the broader policy narrative, thus, again, underlining the need for this to be a participatory process, involving as many of those who were active in the campaign as possible.

The Review recommends that Progressio develops mechanisms for real time, participatory monitoring of public campaigns work.

5.6 The role of the Advocacy Strategy Group

5.6.1 Ensuring broader ownership of the illegal logging advocacy work

The ASG was created soon after CIIR and ICD merged and became Progressio, in order to address a number of concerns. The first was the bringing together of the policy and advocacy and programme functions from the merger and ensuring corporate ownership. ICD brought the link with the programmes, partners and Development Workers, and CIIR brought the policy/advocacy and communications work, but they needed to be brought
together under one roof. At that time ASG was composed of Regional Managers, the International Programmes Director, the Executive Director and the Head of Advocacy.

Policy and Advocacy Officers came into the newly formed Progressio having had a high degree of autonomy, an aspect of the ‘think tank’ culture which has continued until fairly recently in the organisation. This is not a criticism, but an observation, and in fact external observers\(^9\) have commented that in some ways this has been one of Progressio’s strengths saying that the degree of trust placed in Policy & Advocacy Officers, and their flexibility and relative independence has enabled Progressio to respond creatively to changing contexts. CIIR achieved its reputation partly as a think-tank, as the result of its strong and well-researched policy and advocacy work.

The second concern was to ensure oversight and corporate ownership of policy and advocacy work, and there is clear evidence of the ASG in overseeing the management and implementation of the illegal logging advocacy work. It agreed the original concept note, which was revised following ASG comments and resubmitted for review, and supported the P & A-LAC in the development of the strategy. The approval process has not changed significantly, except that now the P & AO has to submit that concept note to the Advocacy Manager and to ASG for approval. Much of the monitoring work now seems to take place within the line management relationship. There is clear evidence in the ASG minutes from 2010 of its role in reviewing the new draft APPs, of challenging, and urging clearer links to the RICA framework, and in deciding the future of the illegal logging work. ASG has also clearly played its role in ensuring that wider consultation takes place in connection with future advocacy work: “the ASG agreed subject to amendments that this should be taken to a consultation with relevant Country Representatives/Sub Regional Managers, communications, fundraising staff” (ASG Jan 2011).

The ASG has a role in providing quality assessment of the whole advocacy planning process – from concept note through to the quality of the monitoring processes. Although the advocacy/policy work has been fully integrated into the RICA system, there seems to be some concern that the ASG sometimes has to ask for documentation, rather than it being automatically available, so perhaps this is something that still needs clarification. The ASG has contributed significantly to ensuring that the advocacy work is corporately held and understood, and has been under the ‘strategic’ umbrella, and, latterly, into the organisational AMR and RICA processes.

Now, in 2011, the challenge is to ensure that the Policy and Advocacy work are outward facing enough to contribute to building a stronger supporter base so that Progressio can claim its deserved public presence. After the initial merging of ICD and CIIR, Policy and Advocacy staff were located within the International Programmes team and reported to the Regional Managers. Meanwhile, campaigns, fundraising and media work sat within the Communications team. Having brought the programmes and advocacy elements closer together, Progressio then found that its campaigns work was falling through the gap identified in the 2010 Learning Review. The restructuring of 2010 has brought the advocacy and policy work together with campaigns, communications and media, which, as has been seen, is addressing that previously identified gap.

Having addressed the structural issue, the process of staff learning the benefits of working together is on-going and involves ensuring the appropriate level of linkage with campaigns work, with joint and participatory strategic thinking planning and monitoring processes. In relation to this it appears that the task of the ASG is two-fold; firstly to ensure that the Campaigns work is corporately understood and owned, and is brought fully into an appropriately adapted M & E system, and secondly, to ensure that Campaigns and

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\(^9\) During interviews for this Review and the DFID PPA evaluation in 2010.
Policy/Advocacy work are linked in a way that is mutually beneficial, and where neither is the tail wagging the dog.

5.6.2 International ownership of advocacy: the new gap?

The membership of the ASG, in representing the Programmes and communications, and senior management functions has not changed. However, what has changed since the 2010 restructuring is the shifting of almost all regional management of programmes overseas. There are no Regional Managers based in London, only the International Programmes Director, with a Programme Officer assistant. In practice this means less international programmes management representation on the ASG. The potential gap now to be addressed is that opening up between the Policy/Advocacy/Campaigns work, and Progressio’s international programmes. The ASG noted in Dec 2010 that since the restructuring, there were fewer partners available who can feed into environment advocacy work. The response at that stage was to express the need to prioritise advocacy work and ensuring a realistic work load which is strongly linked into existing programmes.

Progressio’s international structure is a work in progress, having to respond to the need to build local supporter bases, profiles and a fundraising base, in Ireland and Latin America, as well as in the UK and therefore being increasingly devolved. This evolving structure will present new challenges which will be a two way street; with supply and demand moving both ways. It will be a challenge to ensure broad international ownership of policy and advocacy work, where needed and to develop mutually agreed responsibilities for providing evidence and the link to partner experience. Staff are less and less physically present together, and the challenges to working to and understanding shared outcomes and notions of success are greater. The Advocacy Strategy Group will have a key role to play in this, and will need to ensure that different needs and interests are adequately represented.

Although the current way of working is evolving, as can be seen in the water and adaptation work, with input from campaigns, partners and Development Workers, a lesson perhaps from the illegal logging work is that the P & A - LAC seems to have held a lot of responsibility and at times the support mechanisms around have been unclear. Also, some of the strategic decisions made during the course of the AP have not been recorded, nor the mechanisms for making them. Furthermore, had she left at any stage, the organisation would have been severely challenged in taking the work forward. The Honduras 07/08 Country Annual Plan mentions the setting up of an advisory work group on illegal logging, but this was never set up. Had it been, it may have been able to serve as reference point for Country staff, partners and Development Workers; for advice on the impact of illegal logging at national level in Honduras and a source of support and information for the P&A LAC. It is unclear why this never happened, or whether any consideration was given to this. There is more support available now to advocacy staff, who are able to make more systematic use of volunteers, and are able to work with Advocacy and Communications Development Workers. However, in order to aid the on-going efforts to build corporate ownership and understanding of the policy/advocacy and campaigns group and to ensure joint leadership, and perhaps aid the task of the ASG, it is recommended that Progressio explore the idea of ‘virtual’ and cross-organisational task teams to deliver each Advocacy Project Plan.

The Review recommends that the Terms of Engagement of the ASG be reviewed in order to ensure that it is fit for this new and evolving purpose.

The Review recommends that Progressio explore the idea of ‘virtual’ and cross-organisational task teams to deliver each Advocacy Project Plan.
Section 6: Lessons Learned

6.1 Evidence of Learning from the Advocacy Monitoring Reports

This Review has found a wealth of evidence and learning being recorded through Progressio’s RICA system, and the AMRs, and has drawn extensively on them. Overall the AMRs are informative and well-completed, with very thorough Portfolios of Evidence attached to each one. To that extent RICA is working well, and there is a lot of lesson learning being captured in this way. This has made the task of identifying what reflection is taking place where, and indeed, has felt that Progressio staff are already fully aware of most of the points made during this review.

The following sections try to highlight what it is that staff think needs to be learnt, and examples of where the Review has found learning taking place.

6.2 What and Why does Progressio want to learn?

When asked this question, staff gave several answers, generally grouped in the following areas:

- The advocacy work on illegal logging is coming to its natural conclusion and it would be useful to look back over what we have done and see what we could have done differently, and take those lessons forward into future work.
- We would like to know what others think of that work.
- The organisation has been through some significant changes recently, this is an opportunity for us to look at whether we are doing what we say we are doing.
- All staff interviewed felt that Progressio doesn’t undertake or treat evaluations lightly; for example they chose to undertake the Learning Review on water and adaptation as they felt they had something to learn and the report had had a big impact on the way Progressio now approaches advocacy work.
- Whilst the 2010 International Advocacy Learning Review and the ‘three arrows’ diagram was widely appreciated and has clearly been very influential, some comments indicated that it had been interpreted in some parts of the organisation as having to have everything it says backed up by partner experience, which can be potentially limiting. If the organisation could learn to be clear about what it wants to do and how it wants to do it, then the other issue would fall into place.
- The Learning Review situated campaigning as a service to policy aims, which is ambiguous, and Progressio needs to explore if this is how we want to proceed.
- A general understanding that Progressio’s external, supporter facing work needs to grow and a desire to explore how best to do this.

6.3 Where and what is the organisation learning?

The 2010 Learning Review was indeed a key review for Progressio and one which has had a lot of influence. Significant learning has taken place in the organisation as a result of it:

- The report’s recommendation was one of the drivers in the re-structuring which took place in late 2010, merging the Campaigns, Communications and Advocacy staff into one team. Part of this has also been a recognition that the Advocacy staff now need to be more externally facing. There seems to be an awareness of a pressure for the organisation to be more visible in the ‘market place’, seen to have a supporter base that will take action with and for Progressio, and to do this, advocacy staff need to be communicating with their...
supporters. This is an element of Progressio’s on-going organisational narrative: CIIR was known as a ‘think-tank’ and the merger has led to the organisation, and advocacy work opening up, both to the rest of the organisation, and to the external supporter base.

- The recruitment of a full-time Campaigns Officer.
- The importance of having one document which sets out the organisation’s position and asks, central to the organisation, which is shared with and understood by all those involved.

A key point for reflection for Progressio has been point 6.4: ‘A different way of working?’ which posed a the question as to whether Progressio wants to develop the capacity of others to undertake advocacy work, or do this work itself. It is hard to say whether or not Progressio has learnt the lesson of ‘another way of working’ – is it now a lesson the organisation feels it needs or wants to learn?

We have seen how the link to partners weakened throughout the illegal logging APP period. The AMRs show that the staff have been very aware of this and the implications. However, a lot of conscious thought and effort has gone into building the ‘Southern voice’ into the new Environmental campaign and policy work (Waterproof), which has been heavily influenced by the concerns and thinking of Central American partners e.g. on clean development mechanisms and on hydropower which Progressio alone might not have identified. Furthermore, work has already begun in planning for the advocacy/policy work on fragile states. More systematic mapping and analysis of partners, their work and concerns has already begun so that staff can draw on this and have access to stronger, evidence-based case studies.

These are all lessons that Progressio needed to learn in 2010, and there is, as we can see, evidence of a change in thinking and approach. However, it is not clear to the reviewer that it is desirable or practical to take a position on this, other than it is something which needs to be constantly re-visited. The role of drawing on country programmes and DW and partner experience is surely to highlight the human suffering caused by policies which are not ‘pro’ the marginalised and socially excluded who Progressio seeks to serve. However, therefore it is appropriate for Progressio to be partner-focussed, to listen and be open to being challenged. Furthermore, it is an issue which needs to be considered from the differing points of views of various organisational functions to ensure that a ‘position’ does not become a strait-jacket. There are very real dilemmas here for the organisation. Progressio itself recognises that this has to be looked at on a case by case basis – there is some advocacy work that the organisation can and has to do in the Northern arena, which is also its own constituency.

6.3.1 Impact – Squaring the circle

The weakened link with partners also weakens the accountability back to those who were present in the earliest meetings, and who provided Progressio with the material for case studies etc. Despite the efforts made by staff to relay the outcome back of the campaign back to those involved in Honduras, and their responses being made available on Progressio’s website, there is still an element of this work feeling unfinished. The focus of the final one year Advocacy Project Plan (2011 – 2012) is follow-through on the regulatory aspects of the legislation, up until the point when the implementation regulation is ready. Progressio has clearly had a role to play in the outcome of this campaign and advocacy work, but also has the opportunity to think about the impact of the work and provide some kind of follow up and ‘squaring of the circle’ from Honduras, to the UK, Ireland and the EU, and back to Honduras.

In the April – October 2010 AMR, the P & A-LAC wrote of the need to “ensure follow-up actions regarding the Forestry Law in Honduras and its subsequent enactment...this is vital
to continue enhancing and maintaining our credibility. This is an area where we can demonstrate to policy makers that we are working on these two ends” (i.e. supply and demand”).

This piece of work has been commissioned as a Review; it is far too early to begin to consider the impact of this piece of legislation, and Progressio’s role in it. However, in five years’ time, somebody may be thinking about impact assessment, and Progressio will be well and appropriately placed to be able to consider and demonstrate the impact of its own role in contributing to a life-changing piece of legislation.

That Progressio continues to have some involvement in work in Honduras/C. America which will help it in understanding and demonstrating, in the future, the impact of this work, and thus ‘squaring the circle’

6.3.2 Cross-organisational ownership

To refer to the Waterproof campaign again, we see that the planning has taken a broader approach than previously. The decision to run a campaign on water was taken by the broader Advocacy team. The Environment Policy and Advocacy Officer has been working closely with PI in order to develop joint work on that front. The draft APP has been sent to relevant CRs and Development Workers for comment, and Progressio now makes every attempt to feed back to Development Workers on policy updates and to partners through the CRs. There is visible partner influence in the APP, and much of the planning work has been done jointly with the Campaigns Officer, who has adapted the APP format to write the Campaigns plan. There is still more work to be done to balance policy and supporters needs, but as work has been done to agree the core principles together, this will be easier than previously. A similar approach i.e. of broadening out ownership is also now being taken to planning the forthcoming fragile states work. This has so far included: holding a staff workshop; carrying out virtual consultations producing research and reports and sharing them, and beginning to talking to supporters.

There is now reportedly an understanding of why this needs a wider group to work on the topic, having moved beyond a feeling that other staff are present simply to ‘service’ the policy process. Progressio is seeking to move towards more written policy briefings, which would be approved by the ASG, so that the organisation’s position can be more transparent, and not so open to being based on a personal position or interest

6.3.3 Campaigns

Through the experience of this ‘mini-campaign’ and another recent campaign (but beyond the scope of this review) Progressio has learnt that actions by large numbers of supporters, such as emailing, and large numbers of postcards aren’t necessarily the best way to impact on policy-makers, and indeed, do not play to their strengths. In this campaign, the telephone lobby and targeted emailing of MEPs was a turning point: staff learned that having a small number of committed and relevant (in terms of constituency when lobbying MPs and MEPs) supporters who are willing to make a small amount of effort can make policy makers sit up and take notice.

Campaigns staff are also learning, that, as a result of this campaign that they need more good quality, up-to–date quality materials, and that they may need to be more proactive in working with supporters, with more regular updates, seeking different ways to involved people in planning, monitoring and evaluating the campaigns work.

Perhaps more importantly though, this illegal logging work proves that the old ‘think tank’ model of working is a luxury Progressio can no longer afford. Campaigning clearly brings
benefits to policy work and few risks if done right; it shows to the world what Progressio thinks and it invites people to get involved. Although CIIR established an extraordinary reputation internationally for the quality of its research and advocacy, lobbying and policy work, Progressio’s best may yet be to come, as a campaigning organisation. It clearly cannot meet its organisational objectives with policy work alone; it has to mainstream campaigning to stay relevant and bring supporters, money and relationships for the future.

Progressio’s campaigning is getting better, and will need continued support in order to grow and develop. Whilst the advocacy, policy and lobbying work carried out by Progressio on illegal logging was an exemplary piece of work in terms of the approach, the professionalism and the influence it achieved, it may well have been the public campaigning element which tipped the balance. We will never know for sure, but ‘thinking campaigningly’ has served Progressio well in this instance.

Catherine Sexton
December 2011